Lying and Christian Ethics

Abstract

This book defends the controversial 'absolute view' of lying, which maintains that an assertion contrary to the speaker's mind is always wrong, regardless of the speaker's intentions. Whereas most people believe that a lie told for a good cause, such as protecting Jews from discovery by Nazis, is morally acceptable, Christopher Tollefsen argues that Christians should support the absolute view. He looks back to the writings of Augustine and Aquinas to illustrate that lying violates the basic human goods of integrity and sociality and severely compromises the values of religion and truth. He critiques the comparatively permissive views espoused by Cassian, Bonhoeffer, and Niebuhr and argues that lies often jeopardize the good causes for which they are told. Beyond framing a moral absolute against lying, this book explores the questions of to whom we owe the truth and when, and what steps we may take when we should not give it.

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

“…Intending to deceive you by lying may also be understood in the sense of giving you a reason to believe that I believe what I assert (Chisholm and Feehan , p. 149; Faulkner , p. 543; 2013, p. 2; Mahon ; Fallis , pp. 8–9; Tollefsen , p. 23; Meibauer , p. 132; and Keiser , p. 470). Hence, while Artie is not intending to make the police believe that he saw nothing, he may have intended to make them more confident in thinking that he believes this.…”

“…Nonetheless, rather than abandoning their position, traditionalists about lying – the so‐called deceptionists (Mahon ) – have come up with many innovative arguments that make the interpretation according to which Artie and other liars of his kind lie without intending to deceive much less convincing: e.g. Kenyon (, ), Staffel (, forthcoming), Meibauer (, , , , ), Lackey (), Tollefsen (), Dynel (), Leland (), and Keiser (). And with some replies from Fallis (), Stokke (), and Krstić (), this debate has become very interesting.…”

“…Even a moderate version of Griceanism, which does not require intending that your addressee actually comes to believe what you say, entails that liars either intend to deceive or else they do not assert. Recall that, according to Keiser (, p. 470), a real assertion must be intended to give the audience a reason to believe what is said, and some theories demand that competent asserters must be in a position to inform their interlocutors or affirm something with their assertions (Hinchman ; Tollefsen ). Pinocchio is not giving the prince any reason to believe that Tony is not in his house (~ p ), he is not informing the prince that ~ p , he is not giving him a reason to believe that ~ p , and so forth.…”

Lying in Arthur Miller's The Crucible: A Pragmatic Study

“…A deceptive intention requires the speaker's awareness of the falsity of his/her propositional utterance which is pronounced for whatever goal s/he wants to achieve. Thus, when someone pronounces a false statement without his knowledge or awareness of the falsity of his statement, his statement cannot be considered a lie, but just a false proposition (Tollefsen, 2014). Intentionality and intent of deception differ in degrees from one maxim to another; not all violations of conversational maxims hold the same deceptive liable propositional value (Stratman, 2016).…”

The virtue of honesty, nazis at the door, and Huck Finn cases

“…23 Following Rosalind Hursthouse, one way to develop this thought further is in terms of what she calls resolvable moral dilemmas, which despite being resolvable often are such that "the overridden requirement retains its force in some way, so regret, or perhaps the recognition of a new requirement, are still appropriate" (1999: 44). Similarly, Christopher Tollefsen describes "the sense in which our brokenness and sinfulness -indeed, not just our own, but that of the world -makes it impossible for us to avoid sin; there are genuine cases of necessity in which one must act in a way that is imperfect, guilty sinful -yet nevertheless, to repeat, one must act in that way (Tollefsen 2014: 62, emphasis his; see also 61, 68, 71-72). Note, though, that the Nazi case is not a moral dilemma in the strict sense of being required to perform two actions which cannot be jointly performed and where the moral requirements do not outweigh each other.…”