Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading

Abstract

This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive (so called ‘bald‐faced lies’), and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are indicated.

Intention to deceive, bald-faced lies, and deceptive implicature: Insights into Lying at the semantics-pragmatics interface

“…Meibauer (2014) views a selection of figures of speech used for deceptive purposes as lies, contrary to the prevalent assumption that irony (in tandem with other figures) does not reside in assertions (Chisholm and Feehan 1977;Stokke 2013aStokke , 2014, while lies, as traditionally defined, constitute assertions (e.g. Adler 1997;Bok 1978;Chisholm and Feehan 1977;Fallis 2009Fallis , 2010Kupfer 1982;Mahon 2008aMahon , 2008bMannison 1969;Sorensen 2007;Stokke 2013aStokke , 2013bWilliams 2002). Rejecting the "argument from authority" that lies should be restricted to assertions, Meibauer (2014: 136) avers that "untruthful implicatures are bound to assertions (…) In addition, since in a Gricean framework tropes are interpreted on the basis of maxims, this seems to prove the point that lying 14 while using false implicatures is a case of lying."…”

“…Dynel 2011a;Fallis 2009;Saul 2012;Stokke 2013bStokke , 2014. Whether this phenomenon can be regarded as lying is a distinct matter that is yet to be examined in more detail.…”

“…However, the topic of deceiving by implicature has indeed been appreciated in the literature on deception (e.g. Adler 1997; Chisholm and Feehan 1977;Dynel 2011a;Fallis 2009;Meibauer 2005Meibauer , 2011Saul 2012;Siegler 1966;Stokke 2013aStokke , 2013bStokke , 2014 yet not in such a meticulous manner. Meibauer (2014) teases out the characteristics of false implicatures from various perspectives, and his discussion abounds in many interesting postulates.…”

“…However, "deception" is frequently used as a label for any deception exclusive of lying (e.g. Adler 1997;Carson 2010;Mahon 2008a), which a few authors (Green 2001;Saul 2012;Stokke 2013b) call (merely) misleading. One of the reverberating topics in the linguistic and philosophical scholarship on lying and deception concerns differentiation between lies and other forms of deception, such as withholding information or bullshitting, each displaying its distinctive features.…”

“…In his discussion of the intention to deceive, Meibauer (2014) brings to focus the problem of bald-faced lies, which are frequently viewed as lies that do not involve the speaker's intention to deceive (Carson 2006(Carson , 2010Fallis 2009Fallis , 2010Fallis , 2012Sorensen 2007Sorensen , 4 2010Stokke 2013aStokke , 2013b. In a nutshell, a bald-faced lie revolves around a common belief shared by the speaker and the hearer(s) 5 that the speaker is making a statement which they believe to be false (or which is just plain false).…”