Proceedings of the 2022 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2022
DOI: 10.1145/3488932.3497768
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MAB-Malware

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Cited by 30 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Using these samples, we first evaluate the performance of FUMVar-Ex against the state-of-the-art malware variant generators: FUMVar [11], AIMED [8], RL [6], and MAB-MALWARE [13] (see Section V-A). Next, we examine the detection performance of commercial anti-malware solutions, in particular: Avast, AVG, BitDefender, Kaspersky, Malwarebytes, McAfee, and TrendMicro (see Section V-B).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Using these samples, we first evaluate the performance of FUMVar-Ex against the state-of-the-art malware variant generators: FUMVar [11], AIMED [8], RL [6], and MAB-MALWARE [13] (see Section V-A). Next, we examine the detection performance of commercial anti-malware solutions, in particular: Avast, AVG, BitDefender, Kaspersky, Malwarebytes, McAfee, and TrendMicro (see Section V-B).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several studies have presented various techniques to generate malware variants [5]- [15]. For example, reinforcement learning was used to generate malware samples against antimalware products in [6], [13], [14], as well as a genetic algorithm-based framework named AIMED [8] that randomly applies perturbations to generate malware samples. However, most existing techniques do not ensure that the generated variants' behaviors are identical to the original malware sample's behaviors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…We also consider attackers than perform instruction-level edits in Section 3.3.3. We note that edit distance is a reasonable proxy for the cost of running evasion attacks that iteratively apply localized functionalitypreserving edits (e.g., [20,52,57,60,76]). For these attacks, the edit distance scales roughly linearly with the number of attack iterations, and therefore the adversary has an incentive to minimize edit distance.…”
Section: 22mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…adversarial examples) raises concerns about using these models in practice. For example, successful attacks have been demonstrated in general settings [30,35] and domains such as computer vision [26,33,74], natural language [3,29,67], and malware detection [20,21,40,42,52,60,76,77]. While a multitude of defenses have been proposed against evasion attacks, they have historically been broken by stronger attacks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%