Machiavellian Democracy

McCormick, John

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511975325

Cited by 397 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

102

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…But what kind of conflict between these parts is productive of equal law? Rather than rehearse the long debates in the literature as to whether Machiavelli favours an elitist or a populist reconstruction of Roman social conflicts (Sullivan, 1996;Coby, 1999;Vatter, 2000;Fontana, 2003;Kapust, 2004;McCormick, 2011), I propose to consider Arnaldo Momigliano's theory of the Roman Struggle of Orders (Momigliano, 1984(Momigliano, , 1989. This theory has the unique advantage of reconstructing the conflict without presupposing an anachronistic construal of class divisions inherited from nineteenth-century Roman historiography.…”

Section: The Plebeian State Of Exception and The Struggle For Equal Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the populist account, the people have power when the plebs achieves hegemony within the populus by wresting control of the state from the 'wealthy' elites (Laclau, 2005;McCormick, 2006McCormick, , 2007. Thus, it is no coincidence that Laclau associates 'populist reason' with a systematic rethinking of Gramsci's theory of the 'New Prince', and McCormick names his form of populism a 'Machiavellian democracy' (McCormick, 2011). But did Machiavelli really think together the constitution of a people and the state of exception in such a populist manner?…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The quarrel between populism and republicanism: Machiavelli and the antinomies of plebeian politics

Vatter

2011

Contemp Polit Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article discusses the current debate between populist and republican accounts of democracy. To talk about democracy is inevitably to talk about the idea of a people and its power. From the beginnings of the Western political tradition, 'the people' has referred to both a constituted part of society (populus) and to a part excluded from political society (plebs). The article examines the differences between populism and republicanism in light of the different ways in which these two parts relate to each other, and the resulting conceptions of the power of the people. For populism, the people have power when the plebs achieves hegemony within the populus by wresting control of the state from the 'wealthy' elites. According to the alternative republican account developed in this article, instead, the people have power when the plebs inscribes within the state the possibility of abolishing relations of rule. The distinction between these two conceptions of popular power is pursued in terms of the opposing attitudes that populism and republicanism have in relation to the rule of law. The article also raises a hypothesis as to the historical reasons for these distinctions between populism and republicanism by examining three historical moments, which are crucial for the development of plebeian politics: the early Roman republic, the Augustinian foundation of a Christian republic and the crisis of guild republicanism in Machiavelli's age. Contemporary Political Theory (2012) 11, 242-263. doi:10.1057/cpt.2011.25; published online 11 October 2011Keywords: populism; republicanism; rule of law; plebeian politics; Machiavelli; Cicero The revival of republican political theory has brought to the fore once again the importance of distinguishing between freedom as non-domination, which depends on the rule of law, and freedom as collective self-rule, which depends on a conception of popular sovereignty. For neo-Roman political theorists, popular sovereignty, being a species of sovereignty, is part and parcel of a theory of the state, whereas the rule of law -at least as it is conceived in the modern republican tradition -is not a mutation of state sovereignty r

show abstract

Section: The Plebeian State Of Exception and The Struggle For Equal Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The quarrel between populism and republicanism: Machiavelli and the antinomies of plebeian politics

Vatter

2011

Contemp Polit Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A second kind of response to electoral skepticism is to pursue democratic accountability through non-electoral devices such as random selection, applied to new kinds of legislative process (e.g. Callenbach & Phillips, 2008;Leib, 2004;McCormick, 2011;Sutherland, 2008;Zakaras, 2010). A third response is to pursue further investigation of the precise conditions under which democratic accountability could plausibly result from periodic elections.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intermediate Conditions of Democratic Accountability: A Response to Electoral Skepticism

Maloy

2015

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Attempts to respond to "democratic deficits" in modern constitutional republics must contend with the broad scholarly trend of electoral skepticism. While generally casting doubt on periodic competitive elections' suitability as vehicles of accountability, electoral skepticism does not necessarily entail an absolute devaluation of elections. Some normative and empirical research responds to this trend by refocusing attention on values other than popular power, such as civil peace, which might be served by periodic competitive elections. Another response short of abandoning the value of popular power, however, is to draw out possibilities for institutional design from the restricted conditions under which previous study has found electoral accountability to be plausible or likely. This second task requires an empirically informed exercise in political theory. Pursuing it in a programmatic and policy-relevant way requires descending from the grand, systemic level of constitutional structures and electoral formulae to intermediate (or middle-range) institutional conditions of accountability, such as rules about parties, campaigns, and election administration. My analysis reinterprets principal-agent models to develop four general types of crucial condition for electoral accountability, and then ramifies this scheme by reference to recent empirical research. The result is a "top ten" list of specific institutional factors that could be theoretically decisive in helping or hindering electoral accountability. These ten conditions could guide future research designs and reform proposals alike.

show abstract

“…There are already widespread fears about the corrosive effects of silent citizenship on long-term trust and support for democratic institutions and practices (Coleman 2013;Green 2010;McCormick 2011;Rosanvallon 2008Rosanvallon , 2011Urbinati 2014). Whether these fears prove to be well founded will depend, to a significant degree, on our ability to accurately map and assess the implications of silent citizenship for democracy.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%