The paper presents a cross-disciplinary theory of populism. The first part of the
article considers a definition of populism, the main electorate of populist forces, and
the economic triggers of protest votes for populist parties. The second part deals with
the different types of political populism, the reasons for their actualization in the
21st century, and the institutional consequences of populist power. The demand for
populism comes from fragmented social groups that lost out in the social transformations
following the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and experienced the negative shocks of
globalization. The protest electorate is organized around charismatic leaders who find
'scapegoats' in the form of traditional elites, migrants, or minorities and claim to
speak for the «nation». Populism can contribute to democratization in its early stages.
However, once in power, populists tend to undermine the system of checks and balances,
leading to a decline in the quality of institutions and a slowdown in economic growth.
The third part of the paper assesses the impact of economic populism. It is concluded
that the definitional approaches used in academic literature do not meet the requirement
of universality and do not imply a sufficient level of operationalization necessary for
empirical research. An alternative approach is proposed that develops the «classical»
definition of R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards: economic policy aimed at provoking economic
shocks in order to increase the political ratings of the authorities and downplaying
socio-economic risks. This approach enables economic populism to transcend the
ideological framework of «right-left» economic policy, separate it from the economic
policy of political populists, and evaluate the populist policies of mainstream parties.
The theory of economic populism converges with the theory of political business cycles,
but is not limited to elections and focuses on assessing demand rather than
supply.