Mackie’s Arguments for Error Theory

Abstract

Moral error theory is a form of skepticism about morality, according to which when people make moral judgments (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong”), although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain the properties or relations that would be necessary to render any of these judgments true. This chapter introduces this view and outlines the case offered in its support by J. L. Mackie in his well-known 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Mackie’s arguments for moral error theory include the Argument from Diversity, the Argument from Strangeness, and the Argument from Objectification. The chapter does not aim in particular to defend these arguments, but analyzes them in turn while emphasizing that they are intended to work in conjunction with each other, building a case for moral skepticism. Mackie’s attempt to establish error theory is shown, ultimately, to be inconclusive.