Macro-financial determinants of the great financial crisis: Implications for financial regulation

Abstract

By analysing the macro financial determinants of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 on 83 countries, we find that the probability of suffering the crisis in 2008 was larger for countries having higher levels of credit deposit ratio whereas it was lower for countries having higher levels of: i) net interest margin, ii) concentration in the banking sector, iii) restrictions to bank activities, iv) private monitoring. Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion that can help policymakers calibrate new regulation, by achieving a reasonable trade-off between financial stability and economic growth.JEL Classification: G15; G18; G21

Fiscal sustainability in the presence of systemic banks: the case of EU countries

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New opportunities for co-operatives: New opportunities for people

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