This article examines Australia's long-held doubts about Britain's willingness and ability to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, where Australia's main strategic interests lay. The article argues that Australian concerns long predated the Wilson government's attempt to disengage from east of Suez in the mid-1960s. In doing so, it shows that the Menzies government had since the mid-1950s become increasingly concerned about Britain's resolve and capacity to station substantial forces in the region. In illustrating the extent to which policy-makers in Canberra became suspicious of British long-term strategic aims in Southeast Asia, this article reveals some interesting aspects of the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-war period.In 1965, as its resolve to remain east of Suez weakened, the British Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, began to consider plans for a much reduced military presence in Southeast Asia. 1 Although the British were careful to present their plans not only as part of a broad settlement aimed at ending the Indonesian-Malaysian Konfrontasi, but also as an exercise in contingency planning in the event they were asked to vacate their bases in Malaysia and Singapore, the Australian government sensed a noticeable change of emphasis in British defence thinking and became seriously concerned about British intentions. 2 Australian policy-makers were worried that a British military disengagement would not only destabilise Australia's 'forward defence' strategy, but would also leave a politico-military vacuum in a highly volatile region. 3 Australian fears were eventually realised in 1967-68 when the Wilson government decided to withdraw from east of Suez by the early 1970s, thereby winding up Britain's remaining imperial commitments in the region. 4 This article argues that, far from being a novel phenomenon, Australian anxiety about a British disengagement had on the contrary long preceded the Wilson
