Majoritarian systems, rural groups, and (arrested) welfare state development

Abstract

While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups sometimes accept welfare legislation in return for other policy-concessions in post-electoral bargaining. We illustrate the argument with British and Norwegian historical experiences, and test the implications using panel data from 96 democracies. We find evidence that resourceful agrarian groups effectively arrest welfare state development in majoritarian systems, but not in proportional systems. As expected, the electoral system matters less for welfare state expansion when agrarian groups are weak. The results are robust to using alternative estimators, measures, samples and model specifications.

The Politics of Time: The Political Origins of Working-Time Regulation

“…This former sample is included because it is closer to the theoretical discussion, focusing on 8 Norwegian trade union density in the period leading up to 1940 is below the mean union density of industrialized nations for which data is available (Rasmussen and Pontusson 2018). 9 Proportional representation has been argued to foster working-time reforms (Alesina et al 2005) and more general pro-welfare coalitions (Iversen and Soskice 2006;Knutsen and Rasmussen 2020). The Worker-Farmer coalitions of the 1930s is a common explanation of the general expansion of Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Luebbert 1991; Manow 2009).…”

“… 9 Proportional representation has been argued to foster working-time reforms (Alesina et al 2005) and more general pro-welfare coalitions (Iversen and Soskice 2006; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2020). The Worker-Farmer coalitions of the 1930s is a common explanation of the general expansion of Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Luebbert 1991; Manow 2009).…”