Majority Party Bias in U.S. Congressional Conference Committees

Wielen, Ryan J. Vander; Smith, Steven S.

doi:10.1080/07343469.2011.603018

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Instead, conference groupings are ideologically centered on the chamber median, providing evidence that conferences serve as an informational tool for the chamber (Krehbiel 1991;1993). This finding contrasts from congressional-level research which demonstrated a clear partisan bent in the representativeness of conference committees (Vander Wielen and Smith 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 76%

“…However, standard difference-of-median tests for conference delegations are an insufficient method given that most delegations have small memberships (typically between three and five per state legislative chamber), inhibiting non-parametric difference-of-median tests (Freidlin and Gastwirth 2000). To circumvent this complication, I follow the empirical strategy of Vander Wielen and Smith (2011). They note that "if the number of conference delegations included in the analysis is large, it follows that the distribution of differences between the conference delegation and chamber medians… would have a mean of zero if conferees are indeed representative of the parent chamber" (279).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Congress, the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader control conferee appointments, and can therefore select party loyalists to broker a deal ideologically consistent with their preferences (Lazarus and Monroe 2007). 5 Accordingly, congressional conferees largely abide by majority party preferences (Vander Wielen and Smith 2011). In state legislatures, the majority party in every chamber holds a numerical advantage in conference appointments.…”

Section: Conference Committees and Conference Appointersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unless the state legislative chamber is perfectly homogeneous ideologically (which is unlikely e.g., Shor and McCarty 2011), the majority party median will differ from both the chamber and minority party medians. Like congressional conference delegations, I expect a baseline level of majority party influence over state legislative conference delegations (Nagler 1989;Vander Wielen and Smith 2011). This unconditional effect should lead to 4 These cross-sectional studies are limited by two methodological concerns.…”

Section: Conference Committees and Conference Appointersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Emrich

2022

State Politics Policy Q.

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How representative are conference delegations in state legislative chambers? I argue that differing conference rules across state legislative chambers influence majority party control over conference delegations. With an original data set encompassing all state-level conference committees from 2005 to 2016, I compare the observed policy preferences between conference delegation and majority party medians when the majority party unilaterally appoints and when the minority party has influence over conferee selection. My results show that in state legislative chambers where the minority can influence conference appointments, delegations are ideologically biased away from the majority party. These findings underscore how majority parties are limited when minorities have procedural rights.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 76%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conference Committees and Conference Appointersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conference Committees and Conference Appointersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Emrich

2022

State Politics Policy Q.

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Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House

Lindstädt¹,

Wielen²

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals. While there are legislative and reputational returns to coordinated behavior, party loyalty has a detrimental effect on members' electoral success. We argue that members and parties navigate these competing forces by pursuing partisan legislation when the threat of electoral repercussions is relatively low -when elections are distant. We test our theory by examining House members' likelihood of casting a party vote over the election cycle, assessing whether members strategically alter their levels of party loyalty as elections approach. We also explore whether majority parties strategically structure the agenda according to variation in members' electoral constraints. Our approach allows elite partisanship to follow a dynamic process, which we term dynamic partisanship. We find that with increasing election proximity, members are less likely to cast party votes and parties are less inclined to schedule votes that divide the parties. * Please send all correspondence to Ryan J. Vander Wielen.

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Conference Committee Proposal Rights and Policy Outcomes in the States

Ryan

2014

The Journal of Politics

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Majority Party Bias in U.S. Congressional Conference Committees

Cited by 7 publications

References 33 publications

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Conference Committee Structure and Majority Party Bias in U.S. States

Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House

Conference Committee Proposal Rights and Policy Outcomes in the States

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