Majority Rule, Compromise and the Democratic Legitimacy of Referendums

Abstract

Cheneval and el‐Wakil () defend referendums as a mechanism that allows a popular majority to express itself in situations where the standard channels of representative democracy fail to include the concerns of certain citizens and end up reflecting the views of a minority. By contrast, this comment argues that the likelihood of exclusion and settlement on a minority preference is much greater when policy choices are made by referendum. The reason lies in the plurality of policy options on many issues, and the fact that the most favoured policy may be a shared second or third best. The tendency for most forms of representative democracy to encourage politicians to build majorities through compromises among different coalitions of minorities is more likely to settle on the majority preference of diverse actors holding a plurality views than a referendum based on a binary choice.

Designing Popular Vote Processes for Democratic Systems: Counter‐Proposals, Recurring Referendums, and Iterated Popular Votes

“…Richard Bellamy () suggests that securing non‐domination requires elected officials to forge compromise agreements because ordinary citizens may lack the necessary information to do so . Bellamy also suggests that citizens might use the facultative referendum to tear apart democratic compromises that are carefully constructed to avoid dominating minorities, even if the result is that no one's preferred outcome is realized.…”

Referendums: Tyranny of the Majority?

“…If its procedure is well designed, thresholds are appropriately defined etc., the initiative constitutes an instrument that allows minorities to place a particular issue on the political agenda and, eventually, to prevail over those who have the majority in parliament (e.g., Schiller and Setälä : 9‐11). This makes it a popular vote process that may be especially valuable in a pluralist society, which is characterised by its diversity of individual preferences (Bellamy ) and where an individual may belong to a minority with regard to one issue and to the majority with regard to another.…”

“…Decision‐making in parliament is characterised by mechanisms of deliberation (such as committee meetings and expert hearings) and bargaining processes promoting compromise that tend to protect the interests of minorities. Bellamy () thinks that citizens cannot achieve such compromise for themselves and that referendums, by extracting a single issue from a package, allow an organised minority to contest compromises among elected representatives. Similarly, Claus Offe (: 19) argues that referendums eliminate the space for arguing, bargaining, and compromise‐finding.…”

“…Similarly, Claus Offe (: 19) argues that referendums eliminate the space for arguing, bargaining, and compromise‐finding. According to Bellamy (), referendums are especially damaging in segmented societies because they can be used by one minority to appeal to the majority in a way that risks dominating other minorities.…”

“…The concern that referendums lead to less considered and enlightened decisions than parliamentary decision‐making and, even more precariously, may be used to oppress minorities is the common thread running through all three replies to the lead piece by Francis Cheneval and Alice el‐Wakil (). Richard Bellamy (: 313) argues that referendums “risk being a mechanism whereby a majority dominates a minority”. Simone Chambers (: 305) thinks that “populist majoritarianism is an ever present danger of referendum democracy” that needs to be countered through inclusion of deliberative elements.…”