Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy

Abstract

This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world-a conclusion which follows from a theory I develop in "Synergic Coordination: an argument for cognitive process externalism." Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in "Extended cognition without externalized mental states", and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (in "Reflections and objections"). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration.

Extended emotion

“…We propose to take things a step further" (12). Moreover, for a distinction between the extended mind and the extended cognition hypothesis that is very similar to the one we advocate above, see (Shani 2013)-though note that Shani refers to the extended cognition hypothesis as 'process externalism'. With respect to the referee's second point we would like to clarify that we take the adjectives 'cognitive' and 'mental' to be identical such that 'cognitive processes' and 'mental processes' refer to the same things and so do 'cognitive states' and 'mental states'.…”

Learning from experts: fostering extended thinking in the early phases of the design process

“…Ignorance of complexity is neither conducive to student work nor representative of how design thinking in real life works. One way of addressing this is to consider designing as a process of extended cognition, a metaphysical concept in the psychology literature of problem solving as used by authors such as Shani (2012) and Marsh and Drayson (2010). I thus propose a productive model as conceptual framework dealing with this challenge by combining two seemingly conflicting approaches to cognition (Kirsh, 2009), namely information processing and embodiment, which I discuss in the following section.…”

Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of ‘Off-Line Thinking’

“…The point of this for our purposes here is that it is perfectly possible to hold both PE and not-MSE. That is, it is not contradictory to claim that "at least some cognitive processes are constituted, in part, by trans-cranial (that is, bodily and environmental) variables" and not that "mental states may be similarly externalized", which is the position that Shani actually holds (Shani 2013). 17 Clark and Chalmers, on the contrary, seem to advance a far less moderate and far less inclusive position: 'PE iff MSE' (Clark 2008(Clark , 2009(Clark , 2012Clark and Chalmers 1998).…”

“…Much of the many disputes amongst advocates of different e's are fueled by disagreements about whether some supposed cognitive extension really is constitutive, or merely causal, or 'supportive', after all. In an attempt to clear some of the thicket of these debates, Itay Shani (2013) has recently proposed that there are at least two principal ways of understanding the contested issue: in terms of mental states, which motivates what Shani calls 'Mental States Externalism (MSE)'; and in terms of processes, which motivates what Shani calls 'Process Externalism (PE)'. I take MSE to be typical for an empirical stance, and PE to be typical for a transcendental stance towards vehicles of cognition.…”

“…In that sense, as Shani points out "MSE is philosophically more radical: for while PE says that there is more to cognition than the workings of inner mental states, MSE implies that there is more to mental states than inner mental states!" (Shani 2013).…”