Making property productive: reorganizing rights to real and equitable estates in Britain, 1660-1830

Bogart, Dan; Richardson, Gary

doi:10.1017/s1361491609002433

Cited by 42 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Historically many high capacity states have simplified and eliminated local rules and monopolies to create large national markets governed by the rule of law (Johnson & Koyama, 2017). Bogart and Richardson (2009), for example, show that it was the increased capacity of the British Parliament brought on by the Glorious Revolution that allowed it to eliminated complex feudal constraints on the buying, selling, leasing and mortgaging of property, greatly increasing efficiency and contributing to the British agricultural revolution.…”

Section: Many Weak States Have Complex Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple rules for the developing world

Rajagopalan

Tabarrok

2021

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much of the discussion in favor of simplicity of legal rules and against complex regulation is rooted in economically developed countries with strong state capacity. With economic development and state capacity comes the presumption that complex rules will be enforced. Therefore, analysis focuses on the administrative and error costs, and the unintended consequences of complex rules that are enforced. This paper argues that the Epsteinian insight is even more relevant to the developing world where countries often lack enough state capacity to even take on simple governance tasks. Developing countries often have less than 20 percent of the state capacity of developed countries. However, this does not mean they limit the regulatory structure to a fifth of the tasks. Under-enforcement or non-enforcement of complex rules imposes different costs and unintended consequences on society. Using examples from India, this paper highlights problems of enforcement swamping, deadweight loss, and corruption arising from the under-enforcement of complex rules. To avoid these problems, the paper concludes that a fortiori less developed countries should favor simple rules.

show abstract

Section: Many Weak States Have Complex Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple rules for the developing world

Rajagopalan

Tabarrok

2021

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…wish to honor them, when performance comes due. Some studies of sovereign debt, for example, rely on the median voter theorem (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 2000; Guembel and Sussman 2009). David Stasavage (2003, 2007) and Steven Pincus and James Robinson (2011), while not employing the median voter theorem, offer an essentially majoritarian explanation of Britain's improved credit-worthiness after the Glorious Revolution.…”

Section: Explaining Sovereign Credibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Payling 2009, p. 78), Parliament established the principle that statutes were void without its assent and began crafting its own bills, usually at the behest of interested external parties. Many of these bills embodied sovereign promises to protect assets, rights, or profits (Bogart and Richardson 2009, 2011; Bogart 2011).…”

Section: The Brokers' Compensationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…202–3) shows that the number of acts creating turnpike trusts was nil during every year of the Restoration save one, but that almost no year goes by without a turnpike act after the late 1690s (with the running average below five until mid-century). Examining the broader category of “acts pertaining to property rights,” Bogart and Richardson (2011) show the number of such acts increased sharply after the Revolution, while Bogart and Richardson (2009) focus particularly on estate acts.…”

Section: Mps and The Manufacture Of Private Billsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Marketing Sovereign Promises: The English Model

Cox¹

2015

J. Econ. Hist.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The difficulty sovereign actors face in making their promises credible is widely appreciated (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Myerson 2008). In this article, I argue that the English repeatedly usedinstitutions of monopoly brokerageto mediate trades between the sovereign (offering various promises) and subjects (offering revenues). Once set up—at different times in different markets—institutions of monopoly brokerage sparked substantial and abrupt growth in state revenues. Moreover, these revenue increases cannot be explained by changes in promise-holders’ ability to punish nonperformance, changes in the preferences of pivotal state decision makers, or changes in high constitutional structure alone.

show abstract

“…He also argues that turnpike trusts accounted for at least 20 per cent of the total growth in real land rents during the long eighteenth century, thereby adding at least 1.65 per cent to national income in 1815. In another contribution with G. Richardson, Bogart offers a further analysis of the economic impact of parliamentary legislation, concluding that acts facilitating the restructuring of rights to real and equitable estates during the long eighteenth century enabled the reallocation of land to more productive purposes.…”

Section: (Iv) 1700–1850 Anne L Murphy University Of Hertfordshirementioning

confidence: 99%