Making risk and dangerousness intelligible in intellectual disability

Making the abject: problem-solving courts, addiction, mental illness and impairment

“…Mental illness in general, and schizophrenia in particular, often appear within our cultural imaginary as catalysts for uncontrolled violent behaviour (Glover-Thomas 2011). Similarly, it is often suggested in court hearings that people with cognitive impairments are standing before the court because their impairment is simply, 'unruly' (Spivakovsky 2014(Spivakovsky , 2015. Yet there is a slightly different representation of the 'problem' under construction here.…”

Cripping criminology

“…It could be suggested that proposing a crip criminology is pre-emptive, in that it has not formerly emerged in any coherent way to warrant an exposition of its key themes, let alone argue for its legitimacy as a particular subfield of criminology. However, we posit that this interpretation is incorrect, given the body of research that has already been done in this area (see: Thorneycroft, forthcoming;Baldry, 2014;Dowse, 2017;Dowse, Baldry, and Snoyman, 2009;Harpur and Douglas, 2014;Minkowitz, 2014;Spivakovsky and Seear, 2017;Spivakovsky, 2014;Steele, 2014Steele, , 2017Steele and Thomas, 2014;Thorneycroft and Asquith, 2017;Wadiwel, 2017;Weller, 2014Weller, , 2017 7 . Additionally, it is a timely intervention because criminology has been crip/pled all along.…”

Troubling Law’s Indefinite Detention: Disability, the Carceral Body and Institutional Injustice

“…Thus, according to Kafer, where 'disability is conceptualized as a terrible unending tragedy … [a] better future … is one that excludes disability and disabled bodies' (2). As such, therapeutic interventions become understood and accepted within a 'curative imaginary': 'an understanding of disability that not only expects and assumes intervention but also cannot imagine or comprehend anything other than intervention' (27, Spivakovsky 2014a;2014b;Steele 2017;Voronka 2013;Wadiwel 2017). In a contribution to this scholarship, recently, I argued that the possibility (and indeed the legality) of the multiple forms of disability-specific coercive intervention in relation to disabled people is not attached to a particular material architectural space or a particular court order, but instead attaches to these individuals' bodies via medico-legal designations as disabled and travels with these individuals through time and space such that it is the disabled body that is the site of carcerality and hence the disabled body makes material architectural spaces carceral (Steele, 2017a; see also in relation to restrictive practices Steele 2018 forthcoming).…”

“…In so doing, disability carceral scholars displace the prison as the exclusive or primary site of disabled carceral practices and unsettle the therapeutic logic that negates the carcerality of disability-specific spaces of confinement (see, e.g. Adams and Erevelles, 2017; Ben-Moshe, 2017; Ben-Moshe et al, 2014; Dowse, 2017; Joseph, 2015; McCausland and Baldry, 2017; Spivakovsky and Seear, 2017; Spivakovsky, 2014a, 2014b, 2017; Steele, 2017a; Voronka, 2013; Wadiwel, 2017). In a contribution to this scholarship, recently, I argued that the possibility (and indeed the legality) of the multiple forms of disability-specific coercive intervention in relation to disabled people is not attached to a particular material architectural space or a particular court order, but instead attaches to these individuals’ bodies via medico-legal designations as disabled and travels with these individuals through time and space.…”