Making Sense of Malaysia's China Policy: Asymmetry, Proximity, and Elite's Domestic Authority

Malaysia Between the United States and China: What do Weaker States Hedge Against?

“…As a weaker state, Malaysia has—throughout the post‐Cold War decades—adopted a pragmatic and seemingly contradictory posture toward China (Kuik, ). On the one hand, it has actively engaged Beijing at both bilateral and regional levels, with the goal of using the increasingly close and cordial partnership to cash in commercial and diplomatic benefits from China's growing economic and regional influence.…”

“…As a weaker state, Malaysia's perceptions and policies toward China have always been shaped by long‐term geopolitical considerations. The twin realities of geographical proximity and power asymmetry—compounded by the elites’ historical memory of Malacca‐China interaction and the Malaysia‐China Cold War hostility—have a deep impact on the elites’ belief that China could be both a boon and a bane to Malaysia's external interests (Kuik, ).…”

“…Given Malaysia's past problems with the giant to its north (largely due to Beijing's support for the outlawed Malayan Communist Party and its “overseas Chinese” policy during the Cold War), as well as the unresolved, overlapping territorial claims over the Spratlys in the South China Sea, one would expect Malaysia to balance against China. Yet it has opted to hedge (Kuik, ), a position that has endured three different leaderships—Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003), Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–2009), and Najib Tun Razak (2009–present). In recent years, in the face of China's increasing maritime assertiveness, Malaysia has insisted on hedging, even while two other fellow ASEAN claimants—the Philippines and Vietnam—have stepped up their respective defense cooperation with the “pivoting” and “rebalancing” America, and have used the enhanced military partnerships as the primary leverage of their China and South China Sea policies.…”

Malaysia’s China Policy and the South China Sea Dispute Under the Najib Administration (2009–2018): A Domestic Policy Process Approach

“…Analysts have variably described Malaysia’s friendly policy posture toward China vis‐à‐vis the South China Sea dispute as “playing‐it‐safe” (Parameswaran, ), “selective alignment and strategic ambiguity” (Wey, ), “quiet strategy” (Noor, ), and “hedging” (Kuik, ; Storey, ; Suzuki & Lee, ; Uras, ). Although the focuses of these analysts vary, they all implicitly or explicitly rely on a similar set of explanations: the interplay between systemic and economic factors.…”

“…Noor () writes about the need to balance between “protecting and preserving sovereignty” and the “considerations—political and economic—in order to ensure the country continues to develop, the nation remains united, and the regional peace and stability prevail” (p. 29). Kuik () is most explicit in coming up with a theoretical explanation. He employs a neoclassical realist theoretical framework and contends that the domestic political imperative—the need for regime legitimation through economic development with the help of a cooperative economic agenda with China at least in the short term—balances the systemic influences, including power asymmetry and geographical proximity between China and Malaysia.…”