Making the transition to co-management governance arrangements in Hawai‘i: a framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs

Abstract

Co-management has shown great promise in achieving social and ecological goals worldwide. Despite its potential, significant challenges are faced during governance transformations shifting from traditional approaches to fisheries management to co-management systems. Several factors make Hawai'i an excellent opportunity to study the barriers associated with implementing co-management systems. Hawai'i implements many of the same types of regulatory and fisheries programs found elsewhere in the U.S., yet it also possesses a unique legacy of customary management systems. In addition, a legal pathway has existed for nearly two decades that allows communities to partner with the State of Hawai'i to co-manage nearshore coral reef fisheries. Despite the presence of this enabling legislation, extensive community interest in this approach across the archipelago, and A framework for understanding transaction and transformation costs 389 significant NGO/Foundation support, co-management implementation remains limited. This study uses a mixed methods approach that relies on semi-structured interviews and archival data sources to conduct an institutional analysis of transaction and transformation costs. These costs serve as barriers to co-management implementation. The study identifies several social and organizational barriers preventing co-management implementation including: governmental structure and operations; planning and administrative processes; organized opposition from special interests; and consensus building processes. The institutional analysis further reveals a wide range of transaction and transformation costs associated with this governance transformation that prevent adoption of co-management. We conclude by identifying some actions that can help reduce these implementation barriers to co-management transitions and prevent conservation stalemates.Keywords: Co-management, common pool resources, community-based management, coral reefs, fisheries management, governance, institutional analysis, transaction costs Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the interview respondents and practitioners that graciously shared their time and valuable experience with us. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers that provided valuable comments and insight on earlier versions of this manuscript.

Whose right to manage? Distribution of property rights affects equity and power dynamics in comanagement

“…Despite the promise of comanagement, there are high transaction costs associated with transitioning from a governance arrangement in which government holds most of the property rights in a centralized bureaucracy to an approach in which rights to develop operational rules are shared with communities or user groups (Ayers et al 2017). Common issues identified by scholars with the design and implementation of rights-based approaches in comanagement include a lack of equity in collective choice decision-making processes (Yandle 2003), unequal power relations (Taiepa et al 1997, Nadasdy 2003, a disregard for different worldviews or refusal to accept different data types (Diver 2012), rent seeking by stakeholders (Imperial and Yandle 2005), and elite capture of benefits (MacNeil and Cinner 2013).…”

“…First, the DAR and the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) are underfunded, understaffed, and fisheries have declined under Hawaiʻi fishing regulations (Friedlander and DeMartini 2002, Williams et al 2008, Page et al 2013, Montgomery and Vaughan 2018. Second, these regulations are poorly tailored to local social and ecological conditions (Schemmel and Friedlander 2017), and are often underenforced, leading to de facto open access in many areas (Friedlander et al 2013, Ayers et al 2017. Third, many communities are concerned about declining resource health and are motivated by a desire to restore local care in decision making.…”

“…Nested rules hierarchy and authority for small-scale fisheries in the Hawaiian Kingdom (1810-1892), contemporary centralized management , and contemporary comanagement . Although it may appear that the historical marine tenure system, contemporary centralized management, and comanagement are arranged in a classic bureaucracy, the historical marine tenure system exhibits polycentric institutional structure characterized by multiple overlapping centers of authority (Ayers et al 2017). Historical accounts suggest that decision making was sometimes coordinated at the regional (moku) level, whereas other times, it was devolved to the local level (ahupuaʻa level).…”

“…There is much evidence that existing participatory and decision-making structures are ineffective in Hawaiʻi. Recent research suggests that the participatory rulemaking process is one of the biggest barriers to comanagement in Hawaiʻi (Levine and Richmond 2014, Vaughan and Caldwell 2015, Ayers et al 2017. To achieve legitimacy, the state government must develop participatory spaces where constructive deliberation is not dominated by powerful stakeholder groups, particularly because Hawaiʻi has a multicultural population and a diversity of cultures and worldviews that may already complicate agreements and policy-making (Umemoto 2001, Fung andWright 2003).…”

Is collaborative management always possible? The case of Sauce Grande River Basin, Argentina

“…If local stakeholders are coerced to adopt technical measures imposed by external agents instead of being included in policy design, they would not feel owners of the strategy, avoiding their participation and, even acting against it. Thus, the collaborative management constitutes a hybrid approach that involves different degrees of top-down and bottom-up policy implementation (Ayers et al, 2017). Collaborative strategies allow the participation of local stakeholders in policy design but maintain certain features of the top-down models concerning the decision-making and implementation processes.…”