Making words count: Coalition agreements and cabinet management

Abstract

The cabinet is a central actor in policy making in parliamentary systems. Yet, relatively little is known about how coalition cabinets operate. The delegation of decision‐making authority to ministers invites policy drift, which threatens the cohesiveness of the cabinet's policy programme. Cabinets employ a variety of methods to contain policy drift. The writing of coalition agreements is among the major tools, but there are others, including limiting ministerial autonomy and the use of junior ministers to shadow ministers. The present study demonstrates that coalition agreements are written to contain policy drift and that it is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the cabinet. It studies the factors that affect the likelihood of a coalition agreement being written and how extensive they are, if written. Among these are the ideological diversity found in the cabinet, the use of alternative methods for controlling ministers and the complexity of the bargaining situation.

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

“…First, legislative institutions -most importantly the powers of parliamentary committees and the allocation of committee chairs -serve coalition partners to 'police the bargain' (Carroll & Cox 2012;Fortunato et al 2017;Kim & Loewenberg 2005;Martin & Vanberg 2004, 2011, 2014Zubek 2015). Second, executive institutions, such as cabinet hierarchies and dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., coalition or cabinet committees), also solve intra-coalition conflicts over policy making (Bowler et al 2016;Falcó-Gimeno 2014;Greene & Jensen 2016;Indridason & Kristinsson 2013;Lipsmeyer & Pierce 2011;Martin & Vanberg 2011;Thies 2001).…”

Coalition oversight and blame avoidance in Greece

“…In particular, I find that in unpopular austerity coalitions, junior coalition parties use these measures to a degree that rivals opposition parties, and at times exceeds them. This finding is important not only because it adds to the coalition-monitoring literature by extending the coalition-monitoring 'toolbox,' (Thies, 2001;Martin and Vanberg, 2004Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011;Carrol and Cox, 2012;Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013) but also because it shows that oppositional behavior exists within the coalition. This 'intra-coalition opposition' phenomenon is an important aspect of coalition politics, and thus, further research should identify the reasons for this oppositional behavior and the exact conditions that lead to it.…”

Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil's Multiparty Presidential Regime

“…Party A appoints a junior minister to watch over the acts of the minister from party B, and vice versa. The watchdog junior minister would function mainly as a whistleblower who informs the party (and thus the rest of the coalition) if the minister is deviating from the coalition's informal policy package (Martin and Vanberg 2011) or formal coalition agreement (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). The main condition for the appointment of a watchdog junior minister is the preference divergence between coalition partners.…”