Malice in pretrial negotiations

Guha, Brishti

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2019.01.001

Cited by 4 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…For our experimental parameters, we would require μ ≥ 1/3 for the credibility condition to continue to hold in the NEV treatment. If malice allows the credibility condition to hold, then we do not have the predicted breakdown of the signaling equilibria and, contra Guha (2016Guha ( , 2019, malice can actually lower dispute rates.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…One possibility is malice under which a player receives a positive benefit from inflicting costs on their opponent. Guha (2016Guha ( , 2019 incorporates malice in models with symmetric information and finds malice leads to more disputes, since it offers a means to inflict costs on an opponent. In Appendix C, we similarly incorporate malice into our model 22 Player B does clearly have an incentive to reject such demands empirically.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Appendix C, we consider one-sided malice, but it is worth a brief discussion of what happens if, as in Guha (2016Guha ( , 2019, there is two-sided malice. Guha models defendant as receiving a benefit from litigation costs incurred by the plaintiff.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A plaintiff exhibiting malice potentially perceives a benefit from inflicting costs upon the defendant. Following Guha (2016Guha ( , 2019, we assume this benefit equals a proportion μ > 0 of the costs borne by the defendant. Stage 3 and Stage 5 of our previously specified game are amended as follows:…”

Section: Quiz Screen #1 [Color Figure Can Be Viewed At Wileyonlinelib...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This, in turn, weakens defendant's incentive to reject all demands. One possible motivation for A L plaintiffs with an NEV suit proceeding to trial in the face of rejection is malice (Guha, 2016(Guha, , 2019. We explore the counterintuitive result that malice can increase settlement after presenting our empirical results.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

Deck,

Pecorino,

Solomon

2024

J Empirical Legal Studies

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The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium possible when there are no NEV suits breaks down because plaintiffs with NEV suits do not have a credible threat to proceed to trial, which undermines the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits is not found to cause the signaling equilibrium to unravel or to cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only drop NEV lawsuits three‐fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semi‐pooling range remains unchanged.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Quiz Screen #1 [Color Figure Can Be Viewed At Wileyonlinelib...mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

Deck,

Pecorino,

Solomon

2024

J Empirical Legal Studies

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The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation

Chen

Rodrigues-Neto

2022

Econ Theory

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We model civil litigation as a simultaneous contest between a plaintiff and a defendant who have monetary and emotional preferences. The litigants’ emotional variables capture a non-monetary joy of winning and relational emotions toward each other. A contest success function (CSF) describes the litigants’ respective probabilities of success based on their endogenous litigation expenses and exogenous relative advantages. The model does not specify a functional form for the CSF. Instead, it accommodates any CSF that satisfies general and intuitive assumptions, which capture frequently-used functional forms. A cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover an exogenous proportion of her litigation expenses from the loser. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive expenses. In equilibrium, negative relational emotions (but not a positive joy of winning) amplify the effects of cost shifting, and vice versa. Thus negative relational emotions and positive cost shifting have a similar strategic role, and one can be a substitute for the other. If the litigants’ relative advantages are sufficiently balanced, then more cost shifting (or more negative relational emotions) increases total expenses in equilibrium.

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Case preparation investments in the presence of costly judicial attention

Guha

2024

Research in Economics

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Malice in pretrial negotiations

Cited by 4 publications

References 23 publications

Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation

Case preparation investments in the presence of costly judicial attention

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