2013
DOI: 10.1016/s1361-3723(13)70072-1
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Malware detection by behavioural sequential patterns

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Cited by 53 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…Elisan (2012) states that static analysis would seem like the obvious choice for malware in terms of ease and efficiency; however, he also notes that the results gathered during a static analysis are less useful as the malware is inactive when analyzed [5]. The observations of Ahmadi et al (2013) on static analysis, hold a similar view to Elisan on using static analysis and comment malicious coders can utilize a diverse range of techniques that make static analysis of malware inaccurate, they mention that the techniques used include entry point obfuscation code packing and control flow [1]. Vidyarthi (2015) confirms this view expressing that if a sample of malware is packed, encrypted, complex or a large sample a static analysis can become very difficult [2].…”
Section: Malware Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Elisan (2012) states that static analysis would seem like the obvious choice for malware in terms of ease and efficiency; however, he also notes that the results gathered during a static analysis are less useful as the malware is inactive when analyzed [5]. The observations of Ahmadi et al (2013) on static analysis, hold a similar view to Elisan on using static analysis and comment malicious coders can utilize a diverse range of techniques that make static analysis of malware inaccurate, they mention that the techniques used include entry point obfuscation code packing and control flow [1]. Vidyarthi (2015) confirms this view expressing that if a sample of malware is packed, encrypted, complex or a large sample a static analysis can become very difficult [2].…”
Section: Malware Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although malware exists that targets Linux systems, this is relatively rare: the majority of malware targets Windows systems (in part due to targeting of market share). Furthermore, Linux software repositories provide a trusted source for software installation, which also reduces the likelihood of malware on B Z. Cliffe Schreuders c.schreuders@leedsbeckett.ac.uk 1 Cybercrime and Security Innovation (CSI) Centre, Leeds Beckett University, Headingley Campus, Leeds LS6 3QS, UK Linux. Common practice is to not run anti-malware software on Linux systems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Algumas dessas abordagens incluem: a) modelagem estatística dos padrões de código gerados pelos motores metamórficos [5] [6] [7]; b) análise das distribuições das ocorrências de sequências de opcodes de instruções [8]; c) análise estatística composta pela combinação de métodos de ranqueamento de características de grupos de opcodes de instruções [9]; e d) análise de representações intermediárias que expressam as semânticas do código, tais como: grafos de controle de fluxo [10] [11], grafos de chamadas a APIs do sistema [12] e grafos de dependência de dados [13] [4].…”
Section: Introductionunclassified
“…On the other hand code obfuscation techniques and polymorphic malwares fails at dynamic analysis [6] because it analyses the runtime behavior of a program by monitoring the program while in execution. The main advantage is that it analyses the runtime behavior of a program which is hard to obfuscate [7,8]. But there are some limitations to dynamic analysis.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%