Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation

Mitigating Global Climate Change: Why Are Some Countries More Committed Than Others?

“…The second body of literature employs the tools of game theory to study how the number of actors affects international cooperation. Sandler and Sargent (1995) and Maeler (1991) argue that the minimal coalition required to facilitate cooperation is much larger in the case of carbon dioxide emissions versus ozone-depleting substances. Therefore, cooperation for reducing carbon dioxide emissions is less likely.…”

International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment

“…In contrast, in our model, the minimum number of members needed for the IEA to decide to abate is determined by the optimization of the IEA; here, the IEA's decision maximizes the total welfare of its members, instead of being determined at an earlier stage. Sandler and Sargent (1995) and McGinty (2010) use mixed strategies in one-stage coordination games, but the issue of minimum participation does not arise in their settings.…”

Each Man For Himself? Rival Theories of Alliance Economics in The Early State System

“…Within the joint products model, the level of provision is thus unrelated to the number of members when excludable benefits to total benefits ratio is sufficiently large, whereas in the public goods model larger groups are predicted to be less efficient and to exhibit more free-riding (Cornes and Sandler, 1984). In the joint products model, free riding is unlikely to be a problem as long as the proportion of excludable to total benefits is sufficiently high, since marginal benefits and marginal costs are equated (Sandler and Sargent, 1995).…”