2008
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1416
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Managerial incentives for process innovation

Abstract: Cost-reducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions - an innovation incentive contract - can act as a strategic commitment device. Our model predicts that manager-led firms are more innovative than owner-led firms and that these contracts become less prevalent as product market competition inte… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…He derives the structure of (profits and sales) contracts and shows that, dependent on the strength of R&D spillovers, a managerial firm may have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an owner operated firm. Overvest and Veldman (2008) study how an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions can overcome the problem that cost-reducing investments may not be publicly observable and thus cannot be used as strategic commitments. My model is complementary to the above studies.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…He derives the structure of (profits and sales) contracts and shows that, dependent on the strength of R&D spillovers, a managerial firm may have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an owner operated firm. Overvest and Veldman (2008) study how an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions can overcome the problem that cost-reducing investments may not be publicly observable and thus cannot be used as strategic commitments. My model is complementary to the above studies.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Incentives. Building an economic model of innovation that does justice to the various aspects is, quite obviously, an impossible task (Overvest and Veldman, 2008), and incentives are a highly debated area, where research shows both positive and negative effects on motivation for innovation. Incentives include both financial compensation and nonfinancial intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, but they have different effects on innovation , where the structure of a firm's human resource management HRM system itself functions as a nonfinancial motivation, and compensation may help to shape employee behaviors (Chadwick and Dabu, 2009).…”
Section: Team Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the optimal quality targets must be achieved by the supplier to obtain optimal profit sharing. Research on the provision of incentives in improving process performance is also done by Overvest and Veldman (2008). They proposed a managerial incentives model to managers who can deliver the innovation or improvement in process performance using Cournot competition scheme.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%