Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation

Low, Angie

doi:10.2139/ssrn.934857

Cited by 230 publications

(324 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Karakter Eksekutif Low (2009) menyebutkan bahwa dalam menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pimpinan perusahaan eksekutif memiliki dua karakter yakni sebagai risk taker dan risk averse. Eksekutif yang memiliki karakter risk taker adalah eksekutif yang lebih berani dalam mengambil keputusan bisnis dan biasanya memiliki dorongan kuat untuk memiliki penghasilan, posisi, kesejahteraan, dan kewenangan yang lebih tinggi.…”

Section: Return On Assets (Roa)unclassified

Pengaruh corporate governance, profitabilitas dan karakter eksekutif terhadap tax avoidance pada perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEI

Saputra

Rifa

Rahmawati

2015

jaai

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This study aims to determine the effect of corporate governance, profitability, and executive character to the activity of tax avoidance in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2014. The elements of corporate governance consists of a proportion of the independent board, audit quality and audit committee as well as the elements of profitability is return on assets and the last variable is an executive character. The samples are property, real estate, and building construction companies are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2012-2014. The samples obtained 38 companies were selected by using purposive sampling. Data analysis was performed by hypothesis testing is multiple regression. The results show that the elements of corporate governance, namely the proportion of independent board, audit quality and audit committee did not significantly effect on activity of tax avoidance. While the return on assets and executive character are significantly effect on activity of tax avoidance.Keywords: corporate governance, the proportion of independent board, the quality audit, the audit committee, profitability, return on assets, executive character http://dx.doi.org/10.20885/jaai.vol19.iss1.art1 Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menentukan pengaruh corporate governance, profitabilitas, dan karakter eksekutif terhadap tax avoidance di perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2012-2014. Elemen dari corporate governance berisi proporsi dewan, kualitas audit, dan audit komite, sedangkan profitabilitas berisi return on assets dan karakter eksekutif. Sampel penelitian ini adalah perusahaan properti, real estate, dan building construction yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2012-2014. Sampel yang dibangun adalah 38 perusahaan yang dipilih dengan purposive sampling. Analisis data menggunakan multiple regression untuk menguji hipotesis. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa proporsi dewan, kualitas audit, dan audit komite tidak signifikan mempengaruhi tax avoidance. Sementara itu, return on assets dan karakter eksekutif signifikan mempengaruhi tax avoidance.Kata kunci: corporate governance, proporsi dewan independen, kualitas audit, komite audit, profitabilitas, return on asset, karakter eksekutif PENDAHULUAN Pajak merupakan salah satu sumber penerimaan negara yang paling besar. Dengan demikian sangat diharapkan kepatuhan wajib pajak dalam menjalankan kewajiban perpajakannya secara sukarela sesuai dengan peraturan per-

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Section: Return On Assets (Roa)unclassified

Pengaruh corporate governance, profitabilitas dan karakter eksekutif terhadap tax avoidance pada perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEI

Saputra

Rifa

Rahmawati

2015

jaai

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“…Prior research (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005) documents that the value of CEO equity holdings is tied to short-term stock price (i.e., the value of shares the CEOs are 8 about to sell), which motivates CEOs to focus on short-term prospects of a firm's performance. Also, the value of CEO equity holdings (particularly stock options) is sensitive to the volatility of stock price (e.g., Coles et al 2006;Low 2009), which motivates CEOs to increase the riskiness of firm operations to increase their equity wealth. Consistent with this notion, a recent study by Armstrong et al (2013) finds that the sensitivity of the managers' wealth to changes in risks (i.e., equity vega) is positively associated with financial misreporting that increases firm risk.…”

Section: The Effect Of Ceo Inside Debt Holdings On Financial Reportinmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality

2014

Rev Account Stud

132

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“…Any firm earning significant free cash flows is likely to overinvest in negative net present value projects (Saravia 2013). Low (2009) reveals that the managers with more sustained positions will reduce their risk-taking behavior. Consequently, two potential obstacles may arise such as: an agency problem and a risk-sharing problem (Emenyi 2013).…”

Section: Theoretical Basismentioning

confidence: 99%