‘Managerialism’, ‘ownerism’ and risk

Estrutura de Propriedade e Controle, Governança Corporativa e o Alisamento de Resultados no Brasil <br>DOI:10.5007/2175-8069.2010v7n13p11

“…The ¿ rst hypothesis follows the lead of international works such as those by Chalayer (1994), Smith (1976), Amihud et al (1983) and Rajgopal et al (2002), among others, which have found evidence that in the United States and Europe concentrated ownership can reduce the principal-agent problem between ISSN 1807-1821, UFSC, Florianópolis, ano 07, v.1, n°13, p. 11-34, Jan./Jun., 2010 shareholders and managers, lowering the incentives and opportunities for the latter to manage earnings. However, we do not expect these relations between ownership and control structure and accounting information to apply to Brazilian ¿ rms due to the differences in the degree of shareholding concentration and the associated types of agency problems.…”

“…The relationship between these two themes -ownership structure and income smoothing -has been studied by a number of international authors, like Chalayer (1994), Smith (1976), Amihud et al (1983), Kamin & Ronen (1978), Koch (1981) and Beattie et al (1994). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ¿ rst study to address this particular issue for the Brazilian market.…”

High-tech acquisitions, firm specific characteristics and the role of investment bank advisors

“…Acquirers are sometimes motivated to acquire for reasons that maximize managerial benefits rather than firm value (see Amihud, Kamin, & Ronen, 1983;Lloyd, Hand, & Modani, 1987;Malatesta, 1983;Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). In addition, managers may be overly optimistic about the value of their targets, act on the presumption that their valuations are correct and fail to recognize that there are really no gains in takeovers (Roll, 1986).…”

An examination of the benefits for privately‐held and mutual insurers’ CEOs following an IPO

“…Moreover, Kroll et al (1993) suggests that junior managers will force senior managers to achieve higher levels of performance because the market will also evaluate their productivity partly on the firm's productivity. In conclusion, Fama and other researchers (Amihud, Kamin, and Romen, 1983;and Kroll and Johnson, 1986;Jensen and Smith, 2000) argue that managers will not abuse their positions to diverge from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, as such action will count in the settling up process, thereby reducing the managers' market value.…”