Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

Abstract

Abstract:In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Svalbard, yet avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose. In the late 1990s, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regulations became stricter, as fish stocks were in decline. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow. In 1998, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue. Today, an event in the maritime zone is of concern to both Norwegian and Russian authorities. Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Whereas previous scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Svalbard and its maritime zones, or looked at how Norway manages fisheries in cooperation with Russia, this article brings forth new knowledge by examining the specific incidents in the Zone and placing these in the wider context of conflict theory. Limited to the Norwegian perceptions of the dispute only, this article adds to our understanding of this specific issue of Arctic conflict management and governance. Based on several years of data collection through interviews, the argument put forth is that Norwegian and Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative mechanisms, which in turn are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. In sum, we need to recognise how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.

Mineralvirksomhet på norsk sokkel: Mulige konsekvenser i lys av Svalbardtraktaten og norsk forvaltning av havområdene rundt Svalbard

“…Fiskevernsonen har vaert et konfliktpunkt i det bilaterale forholdet mellom Norge og Russland siden den ble opprettet. Spenninger har spesielt oppstått i forbindelse med norsk håndhevelse av reguleringer, og arrestasjoner av russiske fartøy i 1998, 2001, 2005, 2011og 2020(Moe & Jensen, 2020Østhagen, 2018). Samtidig er det i russisk interesse at fiskebestandene i fiskevernsonen forvaltes forsvarlig og at tredjelands adgang til sonen begrenses.…”

Canada’s and Russia’s Security and Defence Strategies in the Arctic: A Comparative Analysis

“…As Russia does not recognize the aforementioned decision by Norway and considers this area open to international economic activity, Russia's Northern Fleet started regular patrols of the waters around Svalbard in 2004. Although Norway did not "object" to Russian patrols in the FPZ, which it sees as coming under regular flag state control, this does not mean that the potential for conflict is not present, 45 and wariness remains about whether such activities are signs of Russian imperial ambitions and of Moscow's unwillingness to cooperate with Oslo to manage maritime and economic disputes.…”

Exploring Gaps in Arctic Governance: Identifying Potential Sources of Conflict and Mitigating Measures

“…The ACGF, comprising the eight Arctic states' coast guard agencies, mirrors aspects of Arctic Council structure and membership, with a focus on operational safety and stewardship issues commonly faced by the Arctic nations (Conley, Melino, and Østhagen, 2017, p. 22;Dodds, 2020, pp. 262-263;Østhagen, 2020). Additionally, both the ASFR and the Arctic Chiefs of Defense meetings at one time provided an opportunity for strategic informationsharing on military issues in and around the Arctic (Solli, Rowe, and Lindgren, 2013, p. 1), but these dialogues have been interrupted following Russia's invasion of Crimea and subsequent war with Ukraine (Østhagen, 2015;Wishnick, 2017, p. 23;Reinke de Buitrago, 2019, p. 16).…”

“…262-263;Østhagen, 2020). Additionally, both the ASFR and the Arctic Chiefs of Defense meetings at one time provided an opportunity for strategic informationsharing on military issues in and around the Arctic (Solli, Rowe, and Lindgren, 2013, p. 1), but these dialogues have been interrupted following Russia's invasion of Crimea and subsequent war with Ukraine (Østhagen, 2015;Wishnick, 2017, p. 23;Reinke de Buitrago, 2019, p. 16). 8 In addition to state actor-led organizations, numerous indigenous organizations-such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council, and the Arctic Athabaskan Council-are active framers of Arctic governance.…”