Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century

Abstract

Although Germany initiated a far-reaching defence reform process in 2003, it has faced criticism from its NATO Alliance partners for its reticence to contribute to higher-intensity operations under ISAF. The majority of the academic literature focuses upon the impact of German security culture on the willingness of policy leaders to sanction a more offensive role for the Bundeswehr. This study explores two neglected dimensions of reform which have an important impact on the Bundeswehr's ability to undertake full-spectrum operations: military doctrine and capabilities. It finds that low 'executive autonomy' continues to incentivise an inappropriate level of political interference in doctrinal development and constrains the ability of the core executive to overcome the impact of organisational politics between the individual Services on capability investment. However, the article uncovers indicators that the Bundeswehr is beginning to exhibit greater tactical and operational dynamism, following experiences under ISAF and reforms to the 'lessons-learned process'.

The “sleep-walking giant” awakes: resetting German foreign and security policy

“…In this light, the German debate on war seems stuck in the paradigm of large-scale inter-state total war, circa [1944][1945]. As the Afghan experience should have made clear, thinking about war and strategy in the early twenty-first century needs to go beyond a simplistic dichotomy between high-intensity combined arms war-fighting for territorial defence and non-kinetic peace support operations (Noetzel 2010, Dyson 2011, Sangar 2013.…”

Liebe und Macht in der deutsch-amerikanischen Sicherheitsbeziehung 2001-2003

“…»Far from rendering bases obsolet, technical change in communications, intelligence, and logistic systems is making them both more flexible and more capable of reacting quickly to novel military challanges.« (Calder 2007: 49) Die USA begannen im Sinne der RMA in den 1970er Jahren eine Transformation ihrer Streitkräfte, die sich durch die Entwicklung moderner Informationstechnologien und vor dem Hintergrund des Endes des Kalten Kriegs zu entfalten begann (Latham 2002: 238, Freedman 2006. Erst ab 2004 findet diese Entwicklung demgegenüber langsam und selektiv Eingang in die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik (Dyson 2011, Franke 2012. Entgegen der US-amerikanischen Investition in moderne Waffentechnologien wurden in Deutschland nach 1989/90 die Militärausgaben nicht nur in absoluten Zahlen gesenkt.…”

‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism

“…139 The Federal System also plays an important role in decreasing the willingness of the core executive to make far-reaching change to capability procurement, due to presence of powerful regional politicians who lobby against the cancellation of inappropriate 'platform-based' programmes which may lead to significant regional job losses. 140 Furthermore, NCR also points to the particularly close linkages between social and budgetary policy in Germany in the form of the system of Zivildienst whereby 80-130,000 men per year undertake social work at a third of the cost of professionals. 141 However, as NCR predicts, when, following deployment in Afghanistan, compelling evidence emerged of the threat to deployability posed by stasis on conscription, it was quickly dropped from the CDU/CSU party programmes.…”