Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance

Abstract

World Bank evaluations show that recipient performance varies substantially between different projects. Extant research has focused on country-level variables when explaining these variations. This article goes beyond country-level explanations and highlights the role of World Bank staff. We extend established arguments in the literature on compliance with the demands of International Organizations (IOs) and hypothesize that IO staff can shape recipient performance in three ways. First, recipient performance may be influenced by the quality of IO staff monitoring and supervision. Second, the leniency and stringency with which IO staff apply the aid agreement could improve recipient performance. Third, recipient performance may depend on whether IO staff can identify and mobilize supportive interlocutors through their networks in the recipient country. We test these arguments by linking a novel database on the tenure of World Bank task team leaders to projects evaluated between 1986 and 2020. The findings are consistent with the expectation that World Bank staff play an important role, but only in investment projects. There is substantial evidence that World Bank staff supervisory ability and country experience are linked to recipient performance in those projects. Less consistent evidence indicates that leniency could matter. These findings imply that World Bank staff play an important role in facilitating implementation of investment projects.

Divided loyalties? The role of national IO staff in aid‐funded procurement

“…Second, the results indicate that broader theoretical debates on IO bureaucracies can benefit from unpacking individual variation between IO staff involved in decision-making. The findings presented here are part of a growing body of literature that demonstrates that individual differences between staff supervising decisions matter for decision-making by IO staff and member state principals (Chwieroth, 2015;Heinzel & Liese, 2021;Oksamytna et al, 2020). Consequently, the literature on the influence of international bureaucracies (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004;Bayerlein et al, 2020;Eckhard & Ege, 2016;Fleischer & Reiners, 2021) could benefit from collecting broader comparative data on the individuals working in IOs.…”

“…By studying national IO staffs' influence on procurement decisions, this article highlights a potential means through which less powerful member states can influence IO operations. Second, it contributes to the growing debate on the autonomy and influence of international bureaucracies in public administration research (Eckhard & Ege, 2016; Fleischer & Reiners, 2021; Heinzel & Liese, 2021). Most of these studies have not discussed the unique role of national IO staff.…”

The influence of the psychological contract on employee engagement in a South African bank

“…Business purpose is when employees understand their unique contribution and the overall strategic objectives of the organisation ( Agarwal et al, 2021 ). Leaders are vital in providing clear guidelines and expectations in an employment relationship ( Heinzel and Liese, 2021 ; Shingenge and Saurombe, 2022 ). Performance management helps to set the scene for the expectations from the start of the employment relationship ( Sim et al, 2018 ).…”

Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies: the importance of country-specificity

“…When faced with many different international bureaucracies that advise them, national stakeholders will be more inclined to listen to those that appear more relevant to them. The literature on the IMF and the World Bank has highlighted the importance of sympathetic interlocutors for international bureaucracies’ domestic influence (Arpac and Bird, 2009; Bazbauers, 2020; Chwieroth, 2010; Heinzel and Liese, 2021b; Woods, 2006). Sympathetic interlocutors are national actors ‘both willing and able to embrace the priorities preferred by the institutions’ (Woods, 2006: 10).…”