Mandatory Targets and Environmental Performance: An Analysis Based on Regression Discontinuity Design

Tang, Xiao; Liu, Zhengwen; Yi, Hongtao

doi:10.3390/su8090931

Cited by 27 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In the empirical analysis, we control for four categories of factors that may affect provincial environmental performance, following X. Tang and others (). They are governance capacity, environmental pressure, local leaders' experience, and reward‐punishment measures.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, we control for within‐province reward‐and‐punishment measures in the empirical analysis. Following X. Tang and others (), we construct the degree of completion of environmental performance targets in each province as one of the control variables in this article. The formula is as follows:

A c c o m p_{E, j t} = \frac{(E_{j t} - E i n i_{j}) / E i n i_{j}}{G o a l_{j}}

…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whether the rewards and punishment mechanism is effective is still under debate. X. Tang and others () pointed out that the rewards and punishment system in the MTS does not offer significant incentives to local government officials, due to the alienation of its effect and extensive collusion behaviors. This latter view was corroborated by X. Zhou, Lian, Ortolano, and Ye (); Ai, Lian, and Zhou (); and Yu, Cai, and Gao (), as well as in case studies by Chen and Liu (), Lo (), and Ran (), which demonstrated that the reward and punishment measures of the MTS could be easily evaded by local governments during the implementation process.…”

Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While previous researchers have generally reached a consensus that China's MTS has improved environmental policy implementation (Liang & Langbein, ; Mei, ; Schreifels, Fu, & Wilson, ), controversy exists over whether the rewards and punishment system from the central government has significant stimulating effects on local officials. For instance, empirical findings (X. Tang, Liu, & Yi, ) offer support for an alternative story. Despite the dispute in the formal rewards and punishment system, scarce research has been conducted on other possible mechanisms through which MTS has enhanced the implementation of environmental policies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Tang

Liu

2018

Review of Policy Research

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With the deterioration of the environment across the globe, environmental problems have attracted much attention from the public, academia, and governments. This study contributes to the understanding of environmental policy implementation by empirically testing the policy feedback theory and official ranking tournament theory in the Chinese context. In particular, it focuses on how prior environmental performance ranking transitions into future policy performance through the mandatory target system (MTS) in China. The results from this study show that provincial environmental performance ranking serves as an effective incentive for strengthening environmental governance. Low‐ranking provinces will improve their environmental policy performances in future years because of competition in the official tournament. Policy implications are drawn to improve the administrative design of environmental management.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A c c o m p_{E, j t} = \frac{(E_{j t} - E i n i_{j}) / E i n i_{j}}{G o a l_{j}}

…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Mandatory Target System Policy Feedback and The Official Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Tang

Liu

2018

Review of Policy Research

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“…As the key actor in environmental governance, the bureaucracy, including central government and authorities at other levels, designed the environmental accountability mechanism to strengthen the environmental governance performance [47]. Under the top-down authoritative system, traditional localized and disorganized models reduced the governance efficiency [8].…”

Section: Water Governance In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Huang

Chen

et al. 2017

Sustainability

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Administrative fragmentation among government agencies has posed a significant challenge to environmental governance. However, few studies have theoretically examined and empirically measured how local governments in China address this with collaborative approaches. Informed by the ecology of games framework (EGF), this paper examined the status of inter-agency water governance in Dongguan City: the pilot city of aquatic ecologically friendly city of China. The research question we seek to address is: What are the main characteristics of the water governance network in local China? With empirical data collected via survey questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth interviews following the EGF, we find that local agencies have realized the need for cooperation in water resource management. However, they were not substantially familiar with each other in the local policy network, failing to reach their full potential in collaboration. Social network analysis was used to analyze the collaborative network. We found that the network has a weak to moderate density, allowing for collective action problems and leading to insufficient cooperative governance. The network has presented central actors with strong bridging capital to control information and resource flows. We also find strong bonding capital among some policy actors as shown in high reciprocity, clustering coefficient and transitivity. To strengthen the effectiveness of local water governance, efforts should be made to establish a functional department and extend the boundary of collaborative network.

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Does organizational support affect the governance performance of the farm irrigation system? Evidence from the Yellow River basin in China

Fu,

Zhu

2023

Irrigation and Drainage

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The engagement of farmers in the governance of farm irrigation systems is crucial for meeting irrigation demands and enhancing farm productivity. Theoretically, grassroots organizations' concerns and support for farmers will encourage them to participate in the activities of the organization, thus improving the management performance of the irrigation system. This paper examines the influence of organizational aid on the governance of agricultural irrigation systems using field survey data in the Yellow River basin, China. The seemingly unrelated regression model is used to explore the group disparities under distinct organizational circumstances and farm household characteristics. The study demonstrates that the software and hardware support provided by organizations can promote improved management performance of irrigation systems. In addition, considering the heterogeneity of organizational environments, such support is more conducive to enhancing the governance of systems in organizations with more cooperative atmospheres and higher degrees of fairness. From the perspective of the heterogeneity of system users, providing organizational support to growers with a low degree of nonagricultural transformation and labour shortage is more conducive to improving governance performance. Consequently, establishing an excellent organizational atmosphere and targeting organizational support to farmers is a viable means to optimize the governance of irrigation systems.

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Mandatory Targets and Environmental Performance: An Analysis Based on Regression Discontinuity Design

Cited by 27 publications

References 39 publications

Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Performance Ranking and Environmental Governance: An Empirical Study of the Mandatory Target System

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Does organizational support affect the governance performance of the farm irrigation system? Evidence from the Yellow River basin in China

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