2013
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2196425
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Mandatory vs. Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts in China

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Huang et al (2013) show that when a company's earnings increase or decrease is more than 50%, only about 60% of such companies release forecasts. In other words, even for mandatory disclosure, many companies that should make earnings forecasts still do not do so.…”
Section: Fair Value Accounting and Management Forecastsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Huang et al (2013) show that when a company's earnings increase or decrease is more than 50%, only about 60% of such companies release forecasts. In other words, even for mandatory disclosure, many companies that should make earnings forecasts still do not do so.…”
Section: Fair Value Accounting and Management Forecastsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In untabulated tests, we also try the 300-day accumulated abnormal return from the earnings announcement date, but we fail to find any evidence that the ERCs of Big 5 auditors are higher than those of their non-Big 5 counterparts. One possible explanation is the UE information may be pre-empted due to the management earnings forecasts mandated by the listing rules of the Shanghai/Shenzhen exchanges, which require that listed companies should disclose management earnings forecasts when earnings either increase/decrease by 50% or change signs (Huang et al, 2013).…”
Section: Model Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%