Mangroves, fishers, and the struggle for adaptive comanagement: applying the social-ecological systems framework to a marine extractive reserve (RESEX) in Brazil

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Brazil has a network of marine extractive reserves (RESEX), a form of marine protected area (MPA) using comanagement. The RESEX program aims to bring traditionally marginalized populations with natural resource dependent livelihoods into national development processes by empowering them to participate in governance and steward biodiversity conservation. We apply the socialecological systems framework (SESF) and collective action theory to diagnose challenges for comanagement in the Caete-Teperacu marine RESEX near Bragança, Brazil, a multiuse mangrove estuary supporting a small-scale crab fishery. We conducted key informant interviews and build on over 20 years of research in the region to provide an overarching analysis of the challenges facing comanagement. We describe the variables from the SESF in the case context and find that many social and ecological variables interact in clusters over time, and these clusters can be identified as themes, including (1) social and political momentum supporting the RESEX; (2) shifting perceptions of local residents and fishers; (3) patron-client relationships and social-ecological traps; (4) challenges with institutional fit; and (5) the interactions between harvesting closures, compensation, and dependence on local natural resources. Furthermore, we use collective action theory to help explain the role that each variable plays in either hindering or enabling successful governance. Our findings suggest that institutional resilience is needed to make RESEX adaptive to shifting social and political momenta. It could do this by providing more platforms for communication, deliberation, and knowledge exchange among the relevant actors. We believe our findings reflect broader challenges facing RESEX implementation throughout Brazil, and lessons can be learned for MPAs facing difficulties with the implementation of comanagement worldwide.

Do responsible fishing areas work? Comparing collective action challenges in three small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica

“…Enabling conditions include strong leadership (Gutierrez et al 2011;Basurto et al 2013) such as in Paquera-Tambor AMPR, high dependence on area resources (García Lozano and Heinen 2016a) and monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms implemented (Pomeroy et al 2001;Gutierrez et al 2011;London et al 2017) such as in Palito-Montero. Hindering conditions were also similar across AMPRs and with the existing literature, including the lack of external support for enforcement (Torres Guevara et al 2016), mistrust and conflictive or negative past experiences among actors (Torres Guevara et al 2016;Partelow et al 2018) and unclear spatial boundaries (Trimble and Berkes 2015;Torres Guevara et al 2016). Few variables in our analysis were found to be contradicting expected hypotheses.…”

“…The results of our study, and many others, tend to first emphasize the role of single variables in collective action rather than analyzing the interdependent interactions between variables or their relationships to each other (Leslie et al 2015;Partelow et al 2018). However, we discuss below how the interaction of some key variables are positively and negatively influencing collective action.…”

“…Nonetheless, it is evident that momentum to support AMPRs reflects Costa Rica's effort to try to avoid marginalization, to reduce overfishing, unsustainable and/or illegal fishing practices, and to develop the coastal economy by reducing high dependence on extractivism towards tourism and aquaculture. From this perspective, the social-economic setting (S) outside the SES focused on, is of central importance for its diagnosis, as has been found in other studies (Torres Guevara et al 2016;Partelow et al 2018).…”

“…This is most likely explained by interactive effects with other variables, like poor socioeconomic conditions of actors, or high mobility of species. This indicates the need for the continued analysis of collective action if we aim to consider complexity and interactive effects beyond the examination of single variable influences (Leslie et al 2015;Partelow et al 2018). It also indicates the need for in-depth qualitative case studies, which are better suited to hypothesize interaction effects through detailed observational research than, for example, linear statistical approaches (Poteete et al 2010;Partelow et al 2018).…”

“…Analyzed values for each variable for each case were attributed based on qualitative data obtained from informants. For example, a measure of 'absence' was attributed to Monitoring and Sanctioning (GS8) when a consensus on informants' responses expressed null or low monitoring efforts (Basurto et al 2013;Epstein et al 2014;Partelow et al 2018). This allowed relative comparisons of variables within a case (see Table 6).…”