Manifestability and Semantic Realism

Gamble, Denise

doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00159

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Perhaps the first to use explicitly externalist views against the Dummettian arguments was Millar (1977); see also McGinn (1982), Currie & Eggenberger (1983), Devitt (1983), Gamble (2003). Actually Dummett himself seems to have, early on (see e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings

Raatikainen¹

2009

Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communica

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Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency and conveyability of meaning are distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings

Raatikainen¹

2009

Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communica

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Realism and Antirealism

Miller

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

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This article questions whether, once the conception of metaphysics as grounded in the philosophy of language has been jettisoned, Dummett's arguments against semantic realism can retain any relevance to the realist/antirealist debate. By focussing on realism about the external world as an example, it reaches the conclusion that even without Dummett's conception of philosophy as grounded in the theory of meaning, his arguments against semantic realism do retain a limited but nevertheless genuine significance for the metaphysical debate. It emerges, though, that a certain key assumption, connecting the notions of linguistic understanding and knowledge, and necessary if Dummett's arguments are to have even this limited significance, is both underexplained and underdefended. The article concludes with some brief remarks on the cogency of the manifestation argument against semantic realism.

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Manifestability and Semantic Realism

Cited by 2 publications

References 4 publications

The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings

The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings

Realism and Antirealism

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