2014 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security 2014
DOI: 10.1109/cns.2014.6997517
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Manipulating the attacker's view of a system's attack surface

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Cited by 29 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…The aim of deception in cyber security is to guide the adversary to the target of defender's choice, typically a honeypot. Several researchers [117] continued their work on attack prediction by proposing a deception system, which prepares an attractive target for an attacker. For example, if an adversary is supposed to exploit a certain service, a honeypot emulating such service is set up in the target network, either as a new target or as a clone of a real system.…”
Section: Evaluation In Live Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The aim of deception in cyber security is to guide the adversary to the target of defender's choice, typically a honeypot. Several researchers [117] continued their work on attack prediction by proposing a deception system, which prepares an attractive target for an attacker. For example, if an adversary is supposed to exploit a certain service, a honeypot emulating such service is set up in the target network, either as a new target or as a clone of a real system.…”
Section: Evaluation In Live Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, the two works that are closer in spirit to the framework proposed in this paper are [45], [46]; both use a deceptive approach in order to confuse the attacker. In contrast to these, our framework aims at finding the best way to answer the attacker's scan queries.…”
Section: Defending Enterprise Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Additionally, most existing techniques are purely proactive in nature or do not adequately consider the attacker's behavior. To address this limitation, alternative approaches aim at inducing a "virtual" or "perceived" attack surface by deceiving the attacker into making incorrect inferences about the system's configuration [12], rather than actually reconfiguring the system. Honeypots have also been traditionally used to try to divert attackers away from critical resources [13], but they have proven to be less effective than MTDs because they provide a static solution: once a honeypot or honeynet has been discovered, the attacker will simply avoid it.…”
Section: Mtds and Attack Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where t r is the response time, β R is the response time objective, ps is the attacker's success probability computed as P s (age) where age -the resource's average age -is either given by Eq. (12) or (22) for the drop or wait policies, β S is the attacker's success probability objective, and σ is a steepness parameter for the sigmoid. Sigmoids are commonly used as utility functions in autonomic computing because they are smooth, differentiable at all points, and can be easily adjusted to react more or less aggressively to violations of service level agreements through the steepness parameter [19].…”
Section: Determining the Optimal Reconfiguration Ratementioning
confidence: 99%