2017
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150511
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Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds

Abstract: We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold in… Show more

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Cited by 61 publications
(42 citation statements)
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“…By exploiting exogenous changes in the size (i.e. threshold value) of the public works tenders in which PBs are granted larger degrees of discretion in managing procedures, recent studies have focussed on the effect of PB discretion on procurement performance ( Palguta and Pertold, 2017 , Baltrunaite et al, 2018 , Coviello et al, 2018a , Coviello et al, 2018b ). Our work differs from these as our empirical strategy is able to isolate the net effect of reference prices on PB discretion and, in turn, on public expenditure.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By exploiting exogenous changes in the size (i.e. threshold value) of the public works tenders in which PBs are granted larger degrees of discretion in managing procedures, recent studies have focussed on the effect of PB discretion on procurement performance ( Palguta and Pertold, 2017 , Baltrunaite et al, 2018 , Coviello et al, 2018a , Coviello et al, 2018b ). Our work differs from these as our empirical strategy is able to isolate the net effect of reference prices on PB discretion and, in turn, on public expenditure.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In their research, J. Palguta and F. Pertold (2017) also presented evidence of how policy influences the creation of opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement and leads to manipulation of procurement principles. Manipulation is manifested in the procurement below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser extent in goods [18,307].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Significant contribution to the development of the system of public procurement and its control and analytical support has been made by leading domestic scientists such as: L. Katrosha [1], G. I. Pinkas [2], V. Yu. Kwach [3], R. V. Afanasiev [3], A. V. Chernihivskaya [7], N. G. Zdyrko [14; 21], O. D. Shevchuk [14], J. V. Falko [15], and foreign experts: J. G. Murray (2009) [4], L. Sintea (2016) [5], J. Jääskeläinen & J. Tukiainen (2019) [6], D. Coviello (2017) [17], S. Gagliarducci (2017) [17], J. Palguta (2017) [18], F. Pertold, (2017) [18], M. Mironov (2016) [19], E. Zhuravskaya (2016) [19], K. Gugler (2015) [19], M. Weichselbaumer (2015) [20] and C. Zulehner (2015) [20].…”
Section: Brief Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We also find, however, that in other cases there is no such trade-off, and decreasing discounted surplus will reduce corruption without any negative impacts. Examples of this can perhaps be found in the pubic procurement reforms studied by Palguta and Pertold (2015) and Lewis-Faupel et al (2016), who find reducing discretion and decreasing interactions appears to reduce corruption with a non-negative effect on quality. In our model, these correspond to situations where the supervisor is on occasion dispensing the maximum possible bonus, but is never dispensing the minimum.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 97%