Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice

Abstract

“Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As these are roles of power and are crucial to our existence and functioning within epistemic communities, the wrong and harms suffered from this injustice are serious and, I argue, distinct from other types already discussed in the literature. I close by considering an alternative model of mansplaining as a form of silencing, as well as briefly diagnosing its general underlying cause and possible solutions.

Incorporating equity, diversity, and inclusion in science: Lessons learned from an undergraduate seminar

“…Perhaps, in trying to demonstrate their interest and involvement in such matters, the instructors in this story were so eager to contribute to the conversations that they inadvertently engaged in mansplaining (Solnit et al, 2014). Mansplaining is more than just a conversational inconvenience however, as Nicole Dular (2021) points out, and is arguably a form of epistemic injustice because it involves a “dysfunctional subversion of epistemic roles of the hearer and speaker due to the operation of prejudicial identity stereotypes”—those who ought to be in the role of hearer due to their lack of knowledge and expertise about the subject of equity, diversity, and inclusion will falsely assume the role of speaker, and treat the rightful speaker as a hearer. This undermines the epistemic agency of the rightful speaker—for instance, women and/or racialized persons who are often affected gravely by a lack of equity, diversity, and inclusion in the workplace—by denying them the opportunity to give knowledge to others, but also in silencing them and forcing them into the role of the “listener,” thereby suggesting they don't have something of value to add in a discussion which may likely be of greater significance to and have greater repercussions for them.…”

The harms of the internalized oppression worry

“…Rather, it's one speci c way in which the dominant strategically force the oppressed into lower positions of epistemic power and themselves in positions of expertise. For example, Dular (2021) argues that mansplaining should be understood as a forceful subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange wherein dominantly situated agents (speci cally men) make a power grab with respect to expertise. Linda Alco (1991Alco ( -1992 also notes this in her piece "The Problem of Speaking for Others" when she states:…”

Young adults know that their issues are not represented in the news: Israeli young adults and mainstream news media

“…Termed in online public conversations, mansplaining entered academic discourse as a way in which men appropriate the privilege of reframing a subject, correcting and downgrading women, who think otherwise (Knowles, 2019). Mansplaining is also considered to be an epistemic injustice (Dular, 2021), a form of silencing, which turns a social group into a mute entity, without agency. In the Ynet case, the voices of YAs (that would frame problems and solutions for their own lives) are muted.…”