Manufacturers’ integrated strategies for emission reduction and recycling: The role of government regulations

Lyu, Ruxia; Zhang, Cuihua; Li, Zhitang; Li, Yanting

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2021.107769

Cited by 28 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Meanwhile, as the manufacturing industry is the main industrial source of carbon emissions [ 4 ], as well as China’s pillar of economic development, to effectively realize the “dual-carbon” and economic growth goals in a coordinated way, the low-carbon development of the manufacturing industry should thus be the top priority over all other industries. Based on this, the exploration of the manufacturing carbon emission abatement effect and its driving forces have received great concern from all walks of life [ 5 , 6 , 7 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Industrial Coagglomeration, Green Innovation, and Manufacturing Carbon Emissions: Coagglomeration’s Dynamic Evolution Perspective

Zhang

Rongping

Fentaw

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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The achievement of China’s low-carbon development and carbon neutrality depends heavily on the decrease of manufacturing carbon emissions. From coagglomeration’s dynamic evolution perspective, by using panel-threshold-STIRPAT and mediation-STIRPAT models, this study examines the relationships among industrial coagglomeration, green innovation, and manufacturing carbon emissions and explores the direct and indirect function mechanisms. Panel data of China’s 30 provinces from 2010 to 2019 are employed. The results imply that, first, the impact of industrial coagglomeration on manufacturing carbon emissions is nonlinear and has significant threshold effects. Industrial coagglomeration negatively affects manufacturing carbon emissions, and as the coagglomeration level deepens, the negative effect has a diminishing trend in marginal utility. Once the coagglomeration degree exceeds a certain threshold, the negative impact becomes insignificant. At present, for 90% of China’s regions, an increase in industrial coagglomeration level can help reduce manufacturing carbon emissions. Second, green innovation is a vital intermediary between industrial coagglomeration and manufacturing carbon emissions. It is a partial intermediary when industrial coagglomeration is at a relatively lower-level stage and a complete intermediary when industrial coagglomeration is at a relatively higher-level stage. These findings reveal the significance of optimizing industrial coagglomeration and the level and efficiency of green innovation to decrease carbon emissions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Industrial Coagglomeration, Green Innovation, and Manufacturing Carbon Emissions: Coagglomeration’s Dynamic Evolution Perspective

Zhang

Rongping

Fentaw

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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“…It can be concluded that subsidizing to both members is more profitable for supply chain members and government in terms of environment protection and economic development. Lyu et al [ 20 ] investigated how government regulations (cap-and-trade, strict carbon cap and carbon tax) to curb emissions differs systematically, and the manufacturer’s recycling decision. Yu et al [ 21 ] investigated the carbon emission reduction efforts and pricing decisions for a two chains system under carbon taxation, found that as long as carbon taxation occurs, each supply chain members’ vertical collaboration wound drop carbon emission rate and product price.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision models of emission reduction considering CSR under reward-penalty policy

Wang

Xiu-ling

Zhou³

2023

PLoS ONE

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For the two emission reduction technologies of clean process (CT Mode) and end-of-pipe pollution control technology (ET Mode), this paper constructs production and low-carbon R&D decision-making models considering consumers’ green preference, and discusses the impact of social responsibility on firm’s decision-making, profit and social welfare. Then, the difference of optimal decision, profit and social welfare is analyzed when the firm adopt two emission reduction technologies with or without reward-penalty policy. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) Whether using clean process technology or end-of-pipe pollution control technology, consumers’ green preference behavior can increase corporate profit. When consumers’ green preference is small, consumers’ green preference is negatively correlated with social welfare. When consumers’ green preference is large, consumers’ green preference is positively correlated with social welfare. (2) Corporate social responsibility is conducive to improving the level of social welfare, not conducive to the increase of corporate profits. (3) When the reward and punishment intensity is small, the reward-penalty policy cannot effectively motivate the firm to assume social responsibility. Only when the reward and punishment reaches a certain level, the mechanism can have an incentive effect on the firm, and the government can actively implement the mechanism. (4) When the market scale is small, the adoption of end-of-pipe pollution control technology is more beneficial to the firm; When the market scale is large, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt clean technology. (5) If the efficiency of end-of-pipe pollution control and emission reduction is much higher than that of clean process, the firm should choose end-of-pipe pollution control technology, otherwise choose clean process.

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“…pliance vs. violation and implementation vs. non-implementation [31]; cap and trade, carbon tax, or carbon cap [32][33][34]; and taxes and environmental impact levels [28]. Finally, the government can set compensation for players according to the recycling rate they achieved [35], setting a greening threshold level that firms should attain [36], defining an optimal carbon tax for players [33,34,37].…”

Section: Active and Passive Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Specifically, the government plays an active role by providing a subsidy to the consumer [17,18]; subsidy on greening efforts [19]; subsidy to only a qualified recycler [20]; production levy on the manufacturer and a subsidy to the recycler [21]; taxing the OEMs based on sales and distributing the funds to collectors based on waste disposal activities [22]; fixing both the tax for manufacturers and the subsidies for recyclers, including those for eco-innovation [23]; dynamic tax and subsidy mechanisms which are more effective than the static mechanisms [24]; tariffs, tradeable permits as well as government certificates and deregulation [25][26][27]; combining taxes with environmental impact levels [28]; setting the supervisory level when it is a national government and fixing the enforcement level when it is a local government [29]; disposal fee and recycling subsidy [29]; and combining a set of reward and penalty mechanisms to incentivize the adoption of some types of behavior [30]. In addition, the government also intervenes actively by setting incentives and penalties depending on strategies aimed at compliance vs. violation and implementation vs. non-implementation [31]; cap and trade, carbon tax, or carbon cap [32][33][34]; and taxes and environmental impact levels [28]. Finally, the government can set compensation for players according to the recycling rate they achieved [35], setting a greening threshold level that firms should attain [36], defining an optimal carbon tax for players [33,34,37].…”

Section: Active and Passive Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

A Selected Survey of Game Theory Models with Government Schemes to Support Circular Economy Systems

De Giovanni,

Ramani

2023

Sustainability

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This paper reviews the public schemes and mechanisms available for firms to activate and successfully organize circular economy settings. Because of the nature of such negotiated incentives, we focus this survey on game theory models and emphasize three main fields: (1) analysis of public schemes proposed by governments to sponsor the formation of circular economy systems; (2) investigation of government actions in sponsoring these schemes, which can either be active or passive; and (3) analysis of circular economy options used in game theory with government interventions, linked to the waste pyramid framework. Within these fields, we identify six research gaps that future research can address to contribute to this domain’s knowledge. Furthermore, by crossing these three dimensions, we derive 200 possible fields that can be populated with future research and emphasize the ones that require more contributions from researchers in the future.

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Manufacturers’ integrated strategies for emission reduction and recycling: The role of government regulations

Cited by 28 publications

References 50 publications

Industrial Coagglomeration, Green Innovation, and Manufacturing Carbon Emissions: Coagglomeration’s Dynamic Evolution Perspective

Industrial Coagglomeration, Green Innovation, and Manufacturing Carbon Emissions: Coagglomeration’s Dynamic Evolution Perspective

Decision models of emission reduction considering CSR under reward-penalty policy

A Selected Survey of Game Theory Models with Government Schemes to Support Circular Economy Systems

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