Mapping Morality with a Compass: Testing the theory of ‘morality as cooperation’ with a new questionnaire

Abstract

Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC uses game theory to identify distinct types of cooperation, and predicts that each will be considered morally relevant, and each will give rise to a distinct moral domain. Here we test MAC's predictions by developing a new self-report measure of morality, the Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire (MAC-Q), and comparing its psychometric properties to those of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Over four studies, the results support MAC's seven-factor model of morality, but not the MFQ's five-factor model. Thus MAC emerges as the best available compass with which to explore the moral landscape.

Moral Foundations Theory and the Psychology of Charitable Giving

“…In the current research, we focused on the superordinate distinction between binding and individualizing moral foundations. More work is needed to refine the model of the specific foundations underneath these superordinate dimensions (Iurino & Saucier, 2020), contrast it with alternatives (Curry, Chesters, & van Lissa, 2019), and investigate the associations between specific moral foundations and prosociality. Research that maps specific moral foundations to charitable causes, for instance, by framing charity appeals in terms of moral foundations (Winterich, Yinlong, & Mittal, 2012) or by distinguishing moral concerns directed at different in‐groups and out‐groups (Eriksson, Simpson, & Strimling, 2019; Voelkel & Brandt, 2019), would be particularly useful for determining the incremental validity of fine‐grained models of moral intuitions.…”

Morality is fundamentally an evolved solution to problems of social co‐operation

“…It is surprising that Venkatesan now questions whether these theories apply in large‐scale societies. In any case, they do, as recent studies of moral values in the United Kingdom and the United States attest (Curry, Jones Chesters & van Lissa, 2019).…”

“…Indeed, it was our impression that these societies did vary in how they prioritized or ranked the seven moral values. With further research, gathering new data on moral values in contemporary societies, we shall be able to explore the causes of this variation (Curry, Jones Chesters & van Lissa 2019).…”

Just a Big Misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian Affective Polarization

“…I assume that agent i 's dislike of is an increasing function of . It is intuitive and supported by research that individuals form inferences about the moral character of others based on their actions (Uhlmann et al., ), and that a willingness to sacrifice self‐interest for the social good is widely considered to be fundamental to morality and quality of character (Greene, ; Curry et al., ; Moshagen et al., ), which can in turn drive hostility (Haidt, ; Ryan, ; Garrett and Bankert, ). Based on this assumption regarding dislike, I define two forms of affective polarization as follows, with E 0 (.)…”