Mapping public support for the varieties of differentiated integration

Abstract

This article maps and investigates public support for different types of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. We examine citizens’ preferences for DI using novel survey data from eight EU member states. The data reveals substantive differences in support for different types of DI. Factor analyses reveal two dimensions that seem to structure citizens’ evaluations of DI. The first dimension relates to the effect of DI on the European integration project, the second concerns the safeguarding of national autonomy. Citizens’ attitudes on this second dimension vary substantively across countries. General EU support is the most important correlate of DI support, correlating positively with the first and negatively with the second dimension. Our results underline that while citizens generally care about the fairness of DI, balancing out their different concerns can be a challenging political task.

Does differentiated integration weaken parliamentary involvement? Evidence from the European Union's interparliamentary conferences

“…6. On citizens' assessments on DI, see also De Blok and De Vries (2023) and Schuessler et al (2023).…”

Does differentiation beget differentiation?: Examining the link between implementation of and support for differentiation

“…This is often referred to as instrumental differentiated integration. This article focuses on popular support for constitutional differentiation, whose allowance for what Schuessler et al (2023) define as sovereignty-enhancing differentiated integration represents the sharpest break with the EU's current goal of an 'ever closer Union' .…”

“…The phenomenon of differentiated integration is extensively investigated conceptually (Bátora and Fossum 2020;Leuffen et al 2013;Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014), empirically (Gänzle et al 2019;Malang and Holzinger 2020;Ott et al 2017;Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2017;Winzen 2020) and normatively (Bellamy 2019;Eriksen 2019;Lord 2021;Nicolaïdis 2004). The few contributions investigating individual support for differentiated integration focus on liberal economic values (Leuffen et al 2022), Euroscepticism (Blok and De Vries 2023;Schuessler et al 2023), territorially exclusive self-identification (Moland 2022) and party cues (Telle et al 2022). However, we still do not know whether past exposure to differentiated integration leads to greater support for flexible integration in the future.…”

“…This question frames differentiation as a tool for strengthening autonomy and clarifies that countries can choose to opt out. It thus primarily measures what Schuessler et al (2023) refer to as differentiated integration that protects national sovereignty.…”

“…While increasing attention is paid to what shapes popular preferences for such differentiation (Blok and De Vries 2023;Leuffen et al 2022;Schuessler et al 2023;Telle et al 2022), we know little about how actual exposure to it has helped change attitudes towards differentiation. While one of the few contributions examining the effect of differentiation on public opinion shows that allowing for differentiation may strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Schraff and Schimmelfennig 2020), important knowledge gaps remain.…”