2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0769-2
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Mapping the mind: bridge laws and the psycho-neural interface

Abstract: Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regarding the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors claim that neuroscientific data can be employed to advance theories of higher cognition, others defend the so-called 'autonomy' of psychology. Settling this significant issue requires under… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Yet as captured in P 2 and P 2 ′, the bridge laws required for reverse inference are associative statements which, unlike their reductive counterparts, do not presuppose any kind of identity-a priori, a posteriori, necessary, or contingent. Indeed, associative bridge laws are so metaphysically uncommitted that they are also consistent with positions that reject token physicalism, as long as the latter allows a systematic connection between mental and neural properties (Nathan & Del Pinal, 2016). In short, the plausible assumption that the natural kinds of the special sciences are multiply-realizable leaves reverse inference completely unscathed (for a related argument, see Roskies, 2009).…”
Section: Philosophical Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet as captured in P 2 and P 2 ′, the bridge laws required for reverse inference are associative statements which, unlike their reductive counterparts, do not presuppose any kind of identity-a priori, a posteriori, necessary, or contingent. Indeed, associative bridge laws are so metaphysically uncommitted that they are also consistent with positions that reject token physicalism, as long as the latter allows a systematic connection between mental and neural properties (Nathan & Del Pinal, 2016). In short, the plausible assumption that the natural kinds of the special sciences are multiply-realizable leaves reverse inference completely unscathed (for a related argument, see Roskies, 2009).…”
Section: Philosophical Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%