Market access for sale

Kee, Hiau Looi; Olarreaga, Marcelo; Silva, Peri

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.11.001

Cited by 45 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…As contributions do not explicitly enter equation (4), they are not directly used to estimate the structural parameters. As mentioned earlier, Goldberg The only paper we know that actually used contribution data directly is Kee et al (2005). They assumed that lobbies have a …rst mover advantage over government as is the norm in this literature, and looked at foreign lobbying in the US for preferential access (which reduces tari¤s to zero) assuming world prices are given.…”

Section: Some Puzzling Results In Past Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

Imai¹,

Katayama²,

Krishna³

2008

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Section: Some Puzzling Results In Past Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

Imai¹,

Katayama²,

Krishna³

2008

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“…Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006;Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, 2009;Husted, 1991;Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva, 2007;Panke, 2012;Vining et al, 2005). Lobbying plays an important role as it can shape the decisions that are taken, make sure that a status quo prevails and influence the attitudes of decision-makers by moulding the political agenda (Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande et al, 2009;Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998;Svendsen, 2011).…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And although this could be considered a negative motivation (Van Hulten, 2011), it does not necessarily have to be denoted that way as it is another way of interest representation and assurance that the government officials take decisions that are not mismatched to society's needs (Eising, 2007;Ihlen & Berntzen, 2007;Mack, 2005;McGrath, 2005). For example, in the case of lobbying for a free-trade agreement between countries, tariff-barrier-lifting measures or access to the foreign market agreements, lobbying even benefits the consumers by lowering the prices through facilitating intensified competition and thus improving welfare (Gawande et al, 2006;Husted, 1991;Kee et al, 2007;Solis & Katada, 2007). Hence, even though the commercial diplomats will be driven by the interest of their home countries' firms, the outcome of their lobbying does not necessarily harm the host country.…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chapter 9 Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor

Bondarouk¹,

Ruel²

2012

Commercial Diplomacy and International Business: A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration

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Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by Advanced Series in ManagementFor Authors: If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service. Information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comWith over forty years' experience, Emerald Group Publishing is a leading independent publisher of global research with impact in business, society, public policy and education. In total, Emerald publishes over 275 journals and more than 130 book series, as well as an extensive range of online products and services. Emerald is both COUNTER 3 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.*Related content and download information correct at time of download. Chapter 9Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨l AbstractThe aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of how commercial diplomats lobby for public procurement contracts. The institutional environment has ramifications for the manner of lobbying and for the practice of commercial diplomacy. This research brings together these streams of literature, and a conceptual model is developed. By means of an in-depth, single-case study, investigating the lobbying activities of EU diplomats in Indonesia, the study aimed to illustrate the model and draw the list of lobbying activities applicable for commercial diplomats. The findings reveal that in a weak institutional development environment, the diplomats focus on informational lobbying and rely heavily on their networks. If the decision-making powers are decentralized, the diplomats target more decisionmakers. If diplomats do not have an access to decision-makers then 'voice' lobbying is applied. If the decision-makers are not elected, the diplomats do not engage in constituency-building lobbying. The findings illustrate the plausibility of the introduced conceptual model. They also suggest that domestic factors, such as interest in the host country, priority status of the host country and historical bilateral ties can positively influence the lobbying activities of the diplomats as well.

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“…Krishna and Robbins 2006), which is supported by empirical evidence on the role of foreign lobbies in influencing U.S. trade policies such as export growth promotion and tariff preferences (Jobst 2002;Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva 2007). To our knowledge, there exist no studies of the economic effects of foreign lobbying on both trade and environmental policies, in which the countries are linked by trade flows and transboundary stock pollution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…1 Being a key player in the world markets, the United States economy, in particular, has become a focus of lobbying by foreign governments and private organizations, trying to achieve more favorable business conditions (Jobst 2002;Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade, Transboundary Pollution, and Foreign Lobbying

Mason

Umanskaya

Barbier

2017

Environ Resource Econ

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Recent events have fueled the discussion of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. In this paper, we consider the role of foreign lobbying in determining trade and environmental regulations. In particular, we develop a differential game to examine the effects of foreign lobbying on the solutions for transboundary pollution stock control involving two trading countries linked by trade flows. Our analysis suggests that the success of trade policy as an instrument for enforcing cooperation and internalizing externalities depends critically on the degree of governments' corruptibility and susceptibility to international political influence. The model explores optimal pollution regulation strategies, the evolution and equilibrium level of pollution stock, and welfare implications under two different scenarios: in the presence and in the absence of foreign lobbying. Comparison of the outcomes of these scenarios shows that foreign lobbying may lead to a less stringent regulation of the transboundary pollution externality and to degradation of environmental quality.2

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Market access for sale

Cited by 45 publications

References 18 publications

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

Chapter 9 Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor

Trade, Transboundary Pollution, and Foreign Lobbying

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