Market Integration as the Goal of Competition Law: The EU Experience and Its Implications for China

Ma, Jun

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48273-5_2

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The Anti-Monopoly Law is silent on whether individuals or firms can sound "fire alarms" 77 to the central party-state by filing administrative lawsuits against local authorities for any anticompetitive abuse of administrative monopoly. 78 Article 51 provides that it is the higher-level administrative authority, not the courts, to rectify any anticompetitive administrative abuses. 79 The provision confines penalties to the officials "directly responsible" for the abuse, 80 exempting those who abetted, masterminded or condoned it.…”

Section: Leninist Antitrust: the Political Economy Of Regulating mentioning

confidence: 99%

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN CHINA: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY ON THE SUPREME PEOPLE's COURT

Ip¹,

Kwok²

2017

Journal of Competition Law &Amp; Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article studies the rise of judicial review of local administrative monopolies in contemporary China. Anticompetitive abuses of power by local party-states, driven by corruption, have shaken the very foundations of the country's administrative unity and market efficiency. The entrenched skepticism of the authoritarian party-state toward legal institutions notwithstanding, the Supreme People's Court in Beijing has over the past decade steadily aggrandized its own and local courts' authority to constrain regional protectionist, collusive fiefdoms in ways unforeseen by the drafters of the landmark Anti-Monopoly Law; returning incremental but genuine benefits to the central party-state, whose tacit acquiescence in judicial empowerment has over time transformed into express approval. However, given that administrative monopoly is instinct in a Leninist polity, the central party-state and the Court should have few incentives to eradicate local protectionism once and for all. All things being equal, full-fledged, independent judicial review of administrative monopoly will not emerge in China.

show abstract

Section: Leninist Antitrust: the Political Economy Of Regulating mentioning

confidence: 99%

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN CHINA: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY ON THE SUPREME PEOPLE's COURT

Ip¹,

Kwok²

2017

Journal of Competition Law &Amp; Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

From Market Integration to Fiscal Discipline: Analysing the Goals of EU State Aid Policy from an Economic Perspective

Philipsen

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Market Integration as the Goal of Competition Law: The EU Experience and Its Implications for China

Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN CHINA: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY ON THE SUPREME PEOPLE's COURT

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN CHINA: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY ON THE SUPREME PEOPLE's COURT

From Market Integration to Fiscal Discipline: Analysing the Goals of EU State Aid Policy from an Economic Perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About