2015
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2775-1
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Market Reactions to the First-Time Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility Reports: Evidence from China

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Cited by 136 publications
(126 citation statements)
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“…In line with the classical agency‐theoretical assumptions, the opportunistic agent has an information advantage over the principal, which results in information asymmetry between the parties. In order to reduce the resulting risk of moral hazard to a minimum, lenders, who are interested in both a timely repayment of the principal and a risk‐adequate interest, base the likelihood and terms of lending on their assessment of potential financial distress, which determines the firm's future performance, its expected future cash flows, and its ability to repay the obligation (Gong, Xu, & Gong, 2018; Wang & Li, 2015). Since creditors, as an outside party to the company, face high information asymmetries and have only limited access to a firm's private information, they build their estimate of potential financial distress on the publicly available information (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981).…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In line with the classical agency‐theoretical assumptions, the opportunistic agent has an information advantage over the principal, which results in information asymmetry between the parties. In order to reduce the resulting risk of moral hazard to a minimum, lenders, who are interested in both a timely repayment of the principal and a risk‐adequate interest, base the likelihood and terms of lending on their assessment of potential financial distress, which determines the firm's future performance, its expected future cash flows, and its ability to repay the obligation (Gong, Xu, & Gong, 2018; Wang & Li, 2015). Since creditors, as an outside party to the company, face high information asymmetries and have only limited access to a firm's private information, they build their estimate of potential financial distress on the publicly available information (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981).…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Advocates of voluntary reporting attach strong strategic value to the development of CSR, which spreads as a result of the value attributed to it by the company and managers, and where there is a positive relationship between non-financial reporting and company share value [15]. Therefore, the development of proactive CSR practices and the consequent (voluntary) non-financial reporting help to generate trust among investors [14,16] and improve company reputation [17].…”
Section: The Quality Of Non-financial Reporting: Voluntary Versus Manmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the first one belong those studies that support the voluntary character of NFI disclosure, while managers have the task to recognize CSR strategic value [88]. In this context, empirical researches provided evidence that, for listed companies, the quality of NFI disclosure positively affects the company equity value [89,90]. To the second group belong those authors who support the mandatory disclosure of NFI, as they posit that it is more complete, accurate, neutral, objective, and comparable than the voluntary disclosure [91,92].…”
Section: Nonfinancial Information (Nfi) and Financial Outcomementioning
confidence: 99%