“…In line with the classical agency‐theoretical assumptions, the opportunistic agent has an information advantage over the principal, which results in information asymmetry between the parties. In order to reduce the resulting risk of moral hazard to a minimum, lenders, who are interested in both a timely repayment of the principal and a risk‐adequate interest, base the likelihood and terms of lending on their assessment of potential financial distress, which determines the firm's future performance, its expected future cash flows, and its ability to repay the obligation (Gong, Xu, & Gong, 2018; Wang & Li, 2015). Since creditors, as an outside party to the company, face high information asymmetries and have only limited access to a firm's private information, they build their estimate of potential financial distress on the publicly available information (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981).…”