Market response to banks granting lines of credit

Mosebach, Michael

doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(99)00021-7

Cited by 47 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Yayınlanmayan kredi anlaşmalarının hisse senetleri fiyatları üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisi belirlenememiştir. Mosebach (1999Mosebach ( ) 1993Mosebach ( -1996 yılları arasında gerçekleşen 1 milyar ABD Doları üzerindeki kredi sözleşmelerinin borçlanan kurumun hisse senetleri üzerine etkilerini araştırmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçları piyasanın kredi limitinin oluştuğunu haber almasının, kredi alan kurumun hisse senedi fiyatları üzerinde pozitif ve anlamlı etkisinin olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.…”

Section: Literatür öZetiunclassified

Sendi̇kasyon Kredi̇si̇ Kullanim Duyurularinin Bankalarin Hi̇sse Senedi̇ Geti̇ri̇leri̇ne Etki̇si̇

Sarıgül¹

2015

JFRS

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ÖzÇalışmanın amacı, Borsa İstanbul' da işlem gören bankaların kullanmış oldukları sendikasyon kredileri ile ilgili yaptıkları kamuoyu bilgilendirme duyurularının hisse senedi getirileri üzerindeki etkilerinin belirlenmesidir. Olay çalışması yönteminin kullanıldığı araştırma, 2006-2013 dönemini kapsamaktadır. Kredi duyurusu gününden önceki ve sonraki 20 günlük dönem olay penceresi ve olay penceresinden önceki 100 işlem gününü kapsayan dönem tahmin penceresi olarak dikkate alınmıştır. Tahmin penceresindeki aynı bankaya ait birbiri ile çakışan duyurular filtrelendikten sonra 14 bankaya ait toplam 87 sendikasyon kredisi bildiriminin hisse senedi fiyatları üzerine etkisi analiz edilmiştir. Olayın etkilerinin değerlendirilmesi için anormal getiri hesaplaması ve t testi yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar bankaların sendikasyon kredisi alım duyurularının araştırılan dönemde Borsa İstanbul' da anlamlı anormal getiriye neden olmadığını göstermiştir.Anahtar Kelimeler: sendikasyon kredisi, banka, olay çalışması Jel Kodları: G12, G14, G21 THE EFFECT OF SYNDICATED LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BORROWING BANKS' STOCK RETURNS AbstractThe aim of this study is to investigate the effects of the loan announcements on borrowing banks' stock returns in Borsa Istanbul over the period 2006-2013 by using event study methodology. For each announcement; the +/-20 trading days is used as event window and 100 days prior to the event window is used as the estimation window. After filtering the overlapping events in estimation window, the effect

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Section: Literatür öZetiunclassified

Sendi̇kasyon Kredi̇si̇ Kullanim Duyurularinin Bankalarin Hi̇sse Senedi̇ Geti̇ri̇leri̇ne Etki̇si̇

Sarıgül¹

2015

JFRS

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“…Secured loans are more prone to renegotiation (Bester, 1994) while amending restrictive covenants allows to rebalance the allocation of contractual control rights (Dessein, 2005;Garleanu and Zwiebel, 2009). Larger loans with longer maturities are renegotiated more often (with low marginal effects between 1% and 2%) because they are usually associated with lower information asymmetry and less uncertainty (Berger et al, 2005;Mosebach, 1999). Initial loan amount and maturity have a negative effect on maturity and amount favorable outcomes respectively, signaling some sort of tradeoff between initial values of these two loan terms and the propensity to favorably amend each of them separately.…”

Section: Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I also control for the amount outstanding and the number of previously issued loans 11 . Amount and maturity are related to information asymmetry and uncertainty (Berger et al, 2005;Mosebach, 1999). Collateral and covenants are contractual mechanisms serving as signaling and screening devices to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Besanko and Thakor, 1987;Bester, 1985).…”

Section: Methodology and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How legal and institutional environments shape the private debt renegotiation process?

Godlewski

2020

Journal of Corporate Finance

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I investigate how legal and institutional conditions around loan origination influence a private debt renegotiation process. Using a large sample of 15,000 loans on the European credit market, I apply a sequential logit model to consider the renegotiation likelihood, the conditional probability of multiple renegotiation rounds or multiple amended terms, and the renegotiation outcomes conditional on specific loan amendments. I find that legal systems with stronger protection of creditors control rights have a positive influence on renegotiation likelihood and favorable outcomes on amendments to amount or maturity. Stronger legal protection reduces renegotiation likelihood when creditors face potential strategic default by shareholders. The legal and institutional environment has a significant effect on how the initial design of the financial contract impacts the renegotiation process.

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“…Regarding control variables, we remark that loan size, maturity, and covenants have a significant and positive effect on participant reputation, while syndicate size, loan spread, term loan, and tranches have the opposite impact 10 . Larger deals usually signal deal quality (Mosebach, 1999) while longer maturity is associated with lower information asymmetries (Berger et al, 2005). Covenants restrict borrower behavior and thus moral hazard incentives (Rajan and Winton, 1995).…”

Section: Multivariate Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Reputation on the Syndicated Lending Market: A Participant Bank Perspective

Broihanne

Godlewski

2013

SSRN Journal

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Reputation of financial institutions is crucial for their activity and performance. Participant banks often rely on lead bank's reputation in making future syndicated loan participation and lending decisions. We apply ordered probit regression techniques to a sample of more than 4,600 loans to investigate the determinants of participant banks reputation on the European syndicated lending market between 1999 and 2009. We find that the prestige of the lead bank in the first syndicate joined by a participant is crucial for his reputation. With a top 3 leader, participant reputation may increase by 85% while this effect drops to 30% when syndicating with a top 20 arranger. Establishing participant-lead bank relationships, developing a particular expertise in loan purpose or borrower industry, and funding very large deals also contributes to participant reputation. On the contrary, joining small club deals can be detrimental for reputation building.

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Market response to banks granting lines of credit

Cited by 47 publications

References 26 publications

Sendi̇kasyon Kredi̇si̇ Kullanim Duyurularinin Bankalarin Hi̇sse Senedi̇ Geti̇ri̇leri̇ne Etki̇si̇

Sendi̇kasyon Kredi̇si̇ Kullanim Duyurularinin Bankalarin Hi̇sse Senedi̇ Geti̇ri̇leri̇ne Etki̇si̇

How legal and institutional environments shape the private debt renegotiation process?

Building Reputation on the Syndicated Lending Market: A Participant Bank Perspective

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