2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.08.010
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Market size and tax competition

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Cited by 122 publications
(154 citation statements)
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“…Our results support theoretical predictions from Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) and Haufler and Wooton (2010). Specifically, we show that the tax gap responds positively to population size (and GDP) differences between countries and, crucially, that this relationship is significantly attenuated by trade integration.…”
Section: ---Figure 1 About Here ---supporting
confidence: 87%
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“…Our results support theoretical predictions from Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) and Haufler and Wooton (2010). Specifically, we show that the tax gap responds positively to population size (and GDP) differences between countries and, crucially, that this relationship is significantly attenuated by trade integration.…”
Section: ---Figure 1 About Here ---supporting
confidence: 87%
“…While it has long been known that larger countries can sustain higher corporate taxes (a finding that goes back, at least, to Wilson, 1991;Bucovetsky, 1991), recent contributions to the NEG literature predict that bigger countries lose this advantage with increasing trade integration (or falling trade costs) because the site of production then becomes less relevant (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005;Gaigné and Riou, 2007;Haufler and Wooton, 2010).…”
Section: ---Figure 1 About Here ---mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) have shown that in the presence of agglomeration economies tax competition can be second-best welfare-enhancing, as it may mitigate a tendency towards excessive spatial concentration of firms. In fact, agglomeration externalities create rents that can in principle be taxed by the jurisdiction hosting the agglomeration.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Empirical Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%