2005
DOI: 10.3386/w11900
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Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

Abstract: We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an ``oblivious equilibrium,'' in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. We prove that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain ``light-tail'… Show more

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Cited by 160 publications
(188 citation statements)
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“…t |μ (m) λ (m) )] is small, MPE strategies and entry rates at relevant states should be well approximated by oblivious ones. Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007) presented computational results that support this point. 13 Since OE will only have the ability to approximate MPE strategies in states that have a significant probability of occurrence, OE will not be able to approximate equilibria in which behavior depends on off-the-equilibrium-path values, as is typically the case in tacit collusive schemes.…”
Section: (M) (X S (M)mentioning
confidence: 65%
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“…t |μ (m) λ (m) )] is small, MPE strategies and entry rates at relevant states should be well approximated by oblivious ones. Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007) presented computational results that support this point. 13 Since OE will only have the ability to approximate MPE strategies in states that have a significant probability of occurrence, OE will not be able to approximate equilibria in which behavior depends on off-the-equilibrium-path values, as is typically the case in tacit collusive schemes.…”
Section: (M) (X S (M)mentioning
confidence: 65%
“…As stated in the Introduction (see also Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007)), OEs are simple to compute because they only involve one dimensional dynamic programs. However, how well do OEs approximate MPEs?…”
Section: Asymptotic Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…There is also a growing interest in numerical methods for these problems [ALT], [AD10]. A concept called oblivious equilibrium, in which players are assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long-run average industry state and stationary equilibrium models were introduced and studied in detail in, respectively, [WBR08] and [AJW11]. These equilibria are easier to compute than are Markov perfect equilibria and provide good approximations for many important models.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%