Marktform und Gleichgewicht.

Stackelberg, Heinrich von; Engels, Wolfram

doi:10.2307/2224643

Cited by 141 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…It is noteworthy that the physician, as the only rational player in this SEG, can anticipate and steer the eco-evolutionary response of the cancer cells defined by (3)– (5), while the cancer cells can only adapt to the actions already taken by the physician. The theory of Stackelberg games was originally devised in economics to conceptualize interactions with an imbalance in control or power, e.g., the competition between a market leader and follower [83]. Its extension into SEGs can conceptualize not only cancer treatment, but also other problems involving a rational player interacting with an evolutionary system, e.g., pest management, fisheries management, or the control of infectious diseases [33, 34, 82, 130].…”

Section: Game Theory Of Cancer Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The theory of Stackelberg games was originally devised in economics to conceptualize interactions with an imbalance in control or power, e.g., the competition between a market leader and follower [94]. Its extension into SEGs can conceptualize not only cancer treatment, but also other problems involving a rational player interacting with an evolutionary system, e.g., pest management, fisheries management, or the control of infectious diseases [37,38,93,153].…”

Section: Game Theory Of Cancer Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer

Wölfl

Rietmole

Salvioli

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Evolutionary game theory mathematically conceptualizes and analyzes biological interactions where one’s fitness not only depends on one’s own traits, but also on the traits of others. Typically, the individuals are not overtly rational and do not select, but rather, inherit their traits. Cancer can be framed as such an evolutionary game, as it is composed of cells of heterogeneous types undergoing frequency-dependent selection. In this article, we first summarize existing works where evolutionary game theory has been employed in modeling cancer and improving its treatment. Some of these game-theoretic models suggest how one could anticipate and steer cancer’s eco-evolutionary dynamics into states more desirable for the patient via evolutionary therapies. Such therapies offer great promise for increasing patient survival and decreasing drug toxicity, as demonstrated by some recent studies and clinical trials. We discuss clinical relevance of the existing game-theoretic models of cancer and its treatment, and opportunities for future applications. We discuss the developments in cancer biology that are needed to better utilize the full potential of game-theoretic models. Ultimately, we demonstrate that viewing tumors with an evolutionary game theory approach has medically useful implications that can inform and create a lockstep between empirical findings, and mathematical modeling. We suggest that cancer progression is an evolutionary game and needs to be viewed as such.

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Section: Game Theory Of Cancer Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Game Theory Of Cancer Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer

Wölfl

Rietmole

Salvioli

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…He argues that monopoly or duopoly markets are not stable in themselves; they require intervention and regulation from an authority: ‘ Thus it can be seen that the corporative organisation of the market neutralises among other things precisely those structural changes that have led to the destruction of the natural equilibrium in the free market capitalist economy, and it achieves a new equilibrium ’ (p. 94). This chapter was actively criticised by Hicks (), among others. Nevertheless, beyond these considerations and the context into which they have been developed, this section contains mainly theoretical considerations about the need to regulate markets .…”

Section: The Content Of ‘Market Structure and Equilibrium’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Eighty‐one years after its publication in German under the title ‘Marktform und Gleichgewicht’ (1934), Heinrich Von Stackelberg's monograph (1904–1946): ‘Market structure and equilibrium’ (Von Stackelberg, ) probably sits alongside Cournot's monograph (): ‘Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses’, as the most creative and innovative book devoted to the study of strategic interactions in the market . The comments and reviews by Hicks (), Kaldor (), and Leontief () illustrate the fact that the content of this book constitutes a groundbreaking piece of economic theory . It leads Leontief to state: ‘An English translation of Stackelberg's excellent book would be highly desirable’ (p. 559).…”

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confidence: 95%

A Review of Heinrich von Stackelberg's Book: ‘Market Structure and Equilibrium’

Julien

Musy

2015

Australian Economic Papers

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“…“Generally, political options of realization are completely ignored”, and the point of view argued for had to appear under the present circumstances as “nothing but Utopian” (1992, p. 1007) This Utopian element is seen by von Stackelberg as an intrinsic part of theory, “which is marked by the impossibility of rendering it into practice” (p. 1007). Yet the theory reveals a personal resolve ( Willensrichtung ) which could influence reality[3].…”

Section: The Choice Between Economic Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg’s concept of the post‐war economic order

Backhaus

1996

Journal of Economic Studies

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In concluding his review of Stackelberg's (1934) Marktform und Gleichgewicht, John R. Hicks (1935) wrote: "And so we end with a paean to the Corporate State!" Stackelberg was not amused (Möller, 1993) by this throwaway remark, and reacted sharply (Stackelberg, 1938): "Such an allegation is, of course, serious; it is serious not because the corporate state might not deserve a 'paean', but because a theoretical investigation should if at all possible be free of 'eulogies'. I have, however, not succeeded in finding such a 'paean' in my writings. Should we treat theoretical analyses of market based or plan based economic models as 'paeans' if they are more than just stepping stones to a negative judgement of these models?"This episode is significant in more than one way. It reveals that Stackelberg drew a sharp line between contributions to theory on the one hand, and contributions to policy on the other. Issues of political judgement would be acknowledged, but not granted a place in scholarly discussions or exchange. Second, the models of competing economic systems were to be taken seriously and to be discussed in their own right, separate from political judgement that might be passed on their underlying political credos. Yet, third, and this is evident in his lecture to the Freiburg seminar, Stackelberg also acknowledged the field of the theory of economic policy next to and distinct from economic theory. His article on "Limits and possibilities of economic planning"[1] is a contribution to the theory of economic policy, not to economic theory. Fittingly, it was published in ORDO, the "research annual devoted to the order of economy and society".The question of how exactly Stackelberg conceived of his contribution to the theory of economic policy is the topic of this article. The issue is discussed with respect to three different topic areas. Accordingly, the first section deals with the choice between economic systems, the centrally planned economy and the decentralized market economy. Part II is devoted to Stackelberg's attempt at finding a functional theory of economic policy instruments. This issue has become a mainstay of ORDO theoretic work. Third, Stackelberg's theory of economic policy implies a specific (i.e. functional) approach to public finance. This is the subject of the third part. The essay concludes with a summary and final assessment. The choice between economic systemsAlthough Stackelberg already gave similar hints in the final chapter of his Grundlagen [2] (1943, revised 1945), the treatment in the 1943 lecture is much

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Marktform und Gleichgewicht.

Cited by 141 publications

References 0 publications

The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer

The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer

A Review of Heinrich von Stackelberg's Book: ‘Market Structure and Equilibrium’

Stackelberg’s concept of the post‐war economic order

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