Marriage and Opportunism

Brinig, Margaret F.; Crafton, Steven M.

doi:10.1086/467948

Cited by 84 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…By reducing the value of marriage, due to a higher probability of divorce, unilateral divorce law should imply lower fertility. Bargaining models (Brinig and Crafton, 1994, Mc Elroy and Horney, 1981, and Lundberg and Pollak, 1996 also imply a reduction in fertility: according to these models all family decisions are made in strategic ways that depend on the enforceability of the contract and the outside opportunities of each partner.…”

Section: Divorce Laws and Fertilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

Alesina

Giuliano

2006

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun MarriageAlberto Alesina Paola Giuliano The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion.Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Total fertility declined in states that introduced unilateral divorce, which makes dissolution of marriage easier. Most of this effect is due to a decline of out-of-wedlock fertility. We suggest an explanation (and provide supportive evidence for it) based upon the effect of divorce laws on the probability of entering and exiting marriage. Women planning to have children marry more easily with an easier "exit option" from marriage. Thus, more children are born in the first years of marriage, while the total marital fertility does not change, probably as a result of an increase in divorces and marital instability. The effect of changes in divorce laws is greater among whites than African Americans.JEL Classification: J12, J13

show abstract

Section: Divorce Laws and Fertilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

Alesina

Giuliano

2006

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the first model, the benefit of marriage is simply an exogenously given payoff that captures the extra utility couples derive from following social custom (Cohen 1987(Cohen , 2002. In the second model, marriage acts as a commitment device that fosters cooperation and/or induces partners to make relationship-specific investments (Brinig and Crafton 1994;Scott 1990Scott , 2002Wydick 2004). In the third model, the marriage contract serves as a signaling device that can be used by one partner to credibly signal his or her true love (Bishop 1984;Rowthorn 2002;Trebilcock 1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Between 1968 and1977, the majority of states passed such laws, moving from a fault-based regime in which the dissolution of marriage required the mutual consent of both spouses to one in which either spouse could unilaterally file for divorce and no fault had to be proved. It has long been argued in the law and economics literature that these reforms significantly reduced the costs of exiting marriage (Bishop 1984;Brinig and Crafton 1994;Trebilcock 1999;Rowthorn 2002;Scott 1990Scott , 2002.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence

Matouschek¹,

Rasul

2008

The Journal of Law and Economics

107

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the role of the marriage contract. We first formalize three prominent hypotheses on why people marry: marriage provides an exogenous payoff to married partners, it serves as a commitment device, and it serves as a signaling device. For each theory we analyze how a reduction in the costs of divorce affects the propensity to divorce for couples at any given duration of marriage. We then use individual marriage and divorce certificate data from the United States to bring these alternative views of the marriage contract to bear on the data. We exploit variations in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce laws across states to proxy a one-off and permanent reduction in divorce costs. The results suggest that the dominant reason that couples enter into a marriage contract is that it serves as a commitment device.

show abstract

“…In the beckerian tradition, Brinig and Crafton (1994) and Grossbard-Shechtman (1996) have argued that although it is not absurd to believe that changes in divorce law may have transitory consequences on the rate of divorce, it is more doubtful that those impacts prove to be persistent in the long run. The rationale is that a liberal legislation on divorce will increase the incentives for opportunistic behaviors, leading to a decrease in the gains from marriage, and finally discouraging marriage.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Langlais¹

2010

Recherches Économiques De Louvain

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of alternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage ontracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases. JEL Classification: D1-K10-K12-K41-J12Keywords: marriage models, unilateral divorce law, the parents' altruism and protective measures for children.Come on now, honey [Ah! Gudule] Don't you wanna live with me?Excuse-toi (M. Jagger -K. Richards) Ou je reprends tout ça. (B. Vian) * University Nancy 2, UFR AES, 4 Rue de la Ravinelle -CO 7026, 54035 Nancy cedex, France; tel: 03 83 19 27 60; Eric.Langlais@univ-nancy2.fr.† I am grateful to Yannick Gabuthy and Nuno Garoupa for their comments on a previous draft of the paper, and also to the referees of the journal for their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors are mine.

show abstract

Marriage and Opportunism

Abstract: Our marriage is dead, when the pleasure is fled:Twas pleasure first made it an oath.'

Cited by 84 publications

References 2 publications

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence

On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About