Mass Mobilization and the Durability of New Democracies

Kadivar, Mohammad Ali

doi:10.1177/0003122418759546

Cited by 84 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 108 publications

(95 reference statements)

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“…A body of research finds that mass mobilization can fatally weaken an authoritarian regime and bring about a democratic breakthrough (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2011;Kadivar 2018;Thompson 2003). By comparison, the role of protest during a subsequent democratic transition is much less clear cut.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization and Attitudes to Democracy in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Ketchley¹,

El-Rayyes²

2019

Preprint

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Political science has long debated the significance of protest during a democratic transition, but attention has been largely confined to its impact on elite support for democracy. Contributing to scholarship on the attitudinal consequences of mobilization, we examine how protest shaped popular perceptions of democracy during the post-Mubarak transition in Egypt. We do this by matching Wave II of the Arab Barometer survey with geo-referenced protest events reported in Arabic-language newspapers. Our results show that Egyptians came to hold less favourable attitudes to democracy following sustained protest in their district. We find that this relationship was especially pronounced in areas where protestors launched longerlasting, static street protests that targeted public space. Qualitative case details illustrate how such tactics could disrupt everyday life and impact livelihoods. These findings highlight one way in which popular support for democracy can be eroded during a transition. Tore Wig, and three anonymous reviewers gave valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Margit Tavits for her feedback and guidance. Rania AbdelNaeem, Steven Brooke, and Sarah ElMasry generously shared data on the 2005 Egyptian elections, while Michael Robbins provided us with a restricted version of the Arab Barometer and patiently answered questions about the survey methodology. Neil Ketchley the deployment of the survey saw workers, activists, and local residents stage over 2,000 protests across the country. For identification we use an instrumental variable that exploits respondents' spatial relationship to protest ecologies that emerged during the 25th January Revolution.Our results suggest that Egyptians came to hold more negative attitudes to democracy following sustained protest in their district. In such areas, survey respondents were more likely to associate democracy with economic and moral threat, indecisive government, and instability. Disaggregating our measure of mobilization, we find that this relationship was especially pronounced in areas where protestors used longer-lasting, street-level tactics that disrupted public space. Qualitative case details attest to the fallout of this protest and suggest that popular disquiet was related to the negative impact of protest on livelihoods and the routine practices of everyday life.In making sense of these findings, we argue that the high levels of mobilization witnessed in the post-Mubarak transition caused some Egyptians to update their view of how democracy functions in practice. Transitional periods are often low information settings characterized by a high level of uncertainty in which citizens are forming opinions about the emerging nature of a democratic regime (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). In such settings, direct experience can serve as a key source of, or shortcut for, information (Mattes and Bratton 2007). Crucially, protest elicits concessions by inflicting a cost on authorities and this can have knock-on effects for broader public...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization and Attitudes to Democracy in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Ketchley¹,

El-Rayyes²

2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…For example, both the ability and willingness of nonviolent campaigns to accept powersharing agreements could be affected by whether groups face competition with violent fringe groups, and a dominant campaign that faces no challenges may be less likely to accept powersharing proposals and less willing to settle for smaller concessions, in ways that can ultimately undermine pluralism and diversity. 95 of terrorism, nonviolent civil resistance and, armed conflict. She was awarded the Cedric Smith…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Better the Devil You Know? How Fringe Terrorism Can Induce an Advantage for Moderate Nonviolent Campaigns

Belgioioso

Costalli

Gleditsch

2019

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Fringe terrorism is common during nonviolent campaigns. We examine how this can modify the strategic environment between dissident groups and the state in ways that present both challenges and opportunities to moderate factions. Terrorism is intended to promote violent escalation in a conflict, but we argue that fringe terrorist activities in a nonviolent campaign under certain conditions can induce an advantage for well-organized moderate factions. The risk of escalation following terrorism can give the government more incentives to offer concessions to moderate campaign leaders if the movement can credibly prevent armed escalation. The ability to control and prevent violence is more likely when nonviolent movements have a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership, as such campaigns are better able to prevent shifts by supporters towards violent fringes. Using new data on terrorist attacks by factions sharing the same overall objectives as ongoing nonviolent campaigns, we show that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to see substantial gains in spite of fringe terrorist activities when a movement has a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership.

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“…Yet several other recent studies dispute this pessimistic view. These authors argue that democracies emerging from episodes of popular mobilization are more durable (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2016;Kadivar 2018) and that they score higher in measures of electoral and liberal progress(Bethke 2017; Bethke and Pinckney 2016a; Haggard and Kaufman 2016). Specifically, Bethke and Pinkcney (2016a) show that democracies that emerge from nonviolent campaigns have higherquality electoral institutions because they improve the freedom of expression.…”

Section: Elite-led Transitions Vs Transitions From Belowmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, scholars have argued that movements matter because they enhance post-transition civil society. Civil societies with a history of mobilization will be that much more likely to mobilize after transition, and thus better placed to hold officials of post-transition regimes accountable (Bethke 2017;Haggard and Kaufman 2016;Kadivar 2018).…”

Section: Elite-led Transitions Vs Transitions From Belowmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have argued that sustained unarmed mobilization prior to a democratic transition should advance substantive democratization. To measure the duration of antecedent mobilizations, we use a dataset measuring anti-authoritarian mobilizations (Kadivar 2018). The dataset measures sustained unarmed mobilization by the duration (in years) of consistent mobilization leading to the democratic period in question.…”

Section: Contentious Mobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Long March: Deep Democracy in Cross-National Perspective

2019

Self Cite

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Over the last several decades, dozens of dictatorships have become democracies. Yet while each has held free and fair elections, they have varied in the extent to which their citizens realize the ideal of self-rule. Why do some democracies distribute power to citizens while other democracies withhold it? Existing research is suggestive, but its implications are ambiguous. Cross-national studies have focused on democracy's formal dimensions, while work on substantive democracy is case-based. We find that one of the most consistent and powerful explanations of substantive democratization is the length of unarmed pro-democratic mobilization prior to a transition. Through a case study of Brazil, we illustrate that these movements matter in three ways: first, because practices of self-organizing model and enable democratic reforms; second, because movement veterans use state office to deepen democracy; and third, because long movements yield civil societies with the capacity to demand the continuous deepening of democracy.

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Mass Mobilization and the Durability of New Democracies

Cited by 84 publications

References 108 publications

Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization and Attitudes to Democracy in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization and Attitudes to Democracy in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Better the Devil You Know? How Fringe Terrorism Can Induce an Advantage for Moderate Nonviolent Campaigns

The Long March: Deep Democracy in Cross-National Perspective

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