Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements

Lelkes, Yphtach

doi:10.1093/poq/nfw005

Cited by 332 publications

(292 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…In this regard, research in political science indicates a clear pattern of growing ideological polarization between Democratic and Republican congressional officials in recent decades: Democratic leaders have moved to the left, and Republican leaders have moved even more strongly to the right (e.g., McCarty et al, 2006; see also Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, & Cooperman, 2010). This divergence has sent an increasingly strong informational signal that the parties offer very different ideological programs, leading in turn to increased polarization of politically engaged partisans (Abramowitz, 2010;Baldassari & Gelman, 2008;Layman & Carsey, 2002;Lelkes, 2016;Levendusky, 2009).…”

Section: Variability Across Levels Of Political Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contingent, Contextual Nature of the Relationship Between Needs for Security and Certainty and Political Preferences: Evidence and Implications

Federico

Malka

2018

Political Psychology

156

226

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Research on the dispositional origins of political preferences is flourishing, and the primary conclusion drawn from this work is that stronger needs for security and certainty attract people to a broad-based politically conservative ideology. Though this literature covers much ground, most integrative assessments of it have paid insufficient attention to the presence and implications of contingencies in the relationship between dispositional attributes and political attitudes. In this article, we review research showing that relationships between needs for security and certainty and political preferences vary considerably-sometimes to the point of directional shifts-on the basis of (1) issue domain and (2) contextual factors governing the content and volume of political discourse individuals are exposed to. On the basis of this evidence, we argue that relationships between dispositional attributes and political preferences vary in the extent to which they reflect an organic functional resonance between dispositions and preferences or identity-expressive motivation to adopt a political attitude merely because it is discursively packaged with other need-congruent attitudes. We contend that such a distinction is critical to gaining a realistic understanding of the origins and nature of ideological belief systems, and we consequently recommend an increased focus on issue-based and contextual variation in relationships between dispositions and political preferences.KEY WORDS: political preferences, ideology, needs for security and certainty, political expertise Why do individuals' political preferences lean to the left or to the right? To put it mildly, a great amount of social-scientific ink has been spilled addressing this question. Some perspectives suggest that political preferences are a function of interests associated with the positions of the social groups one belongs to, with members of more powerful groups adopting more conservative views (e.g., Bobo, 1999;Huber & Form, 1973;Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970Runciman, 1966;Sears & Funk, 1991;Sidanius & Pratto, 1999;Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). Other approaches have focused more closely on social relationships, with a sizable body of research suggesting that people adopt the political attitudes and beliefs that are normative in the reference groups with which they identify (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954;Merton, 1957;Newcomb, 1943) or common within their families or social networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004;Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Advances in Political Psychology, Vol. 39, Suppl. 1, 2018 doi: 10.1111 bs_bs_banner Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008;Sears & Levy, 2003). Last but not least, research in political science zeroes in on the role of political parties, arguing that individuals acquire the preferences enunciated by the leaders of the parties they identify with (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960;Goren, 2005;Lenz, 2013;Zaller, 1992). Approaches like these share a common thread: They focus on the social or contextua...

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Section: Variability Across Levels Of Political Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contingent, Contextual Nature of the Relationship Between Needs for Security and Certainty and Political Preferences: Evidence and Implications

Federico

Malka

2018

Political Psychology

156

226

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“…We show that if equilibrium fake news and debunking are increased by some parameter change then social welfare will also fall. To the extent that the polarisation of extreme political perspectives is increasing in Western democracies, as suggested for the USA by Lelkes (2016), our model suggests that fake news will continue to rise, despite an increase in debunking activity.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Media, fake news, and debunking

Long¹,

Richardson

Stähler

2019

Economic Record

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We construct a modified Hotelling‐type model of two media providers, each of whom can issue fake and/or real news and each of whom can invest in the debunking of their rival’s fake news. The model assumes that consumers have an innate preference for one provider or the other and value real news. However, that valuation varies according to their bias favouring one provider or the other. We demonstrate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which only one firm issues fake news and we show, in this setting, that increased polarisation of consumers (represented by a wider distribution) increases the prevalence of both fake news and debunking expenditures and is welfare‐reducing. We also show, inter alia, that a stronger preference by consumers for their preferred provider lowers both fake news and debunking. Finally, we compare monopoly and duopoly market structures in terms of ‘fake news’ provision and show that a public news provider can be welfare‐improving.

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“…Both hostility and partisan impasses over policy have increased substantially over this time (Snowe, ; Hetherington and Rudolph, ). Political scientists have dubbed the now well‐documented growth in hostility “affective polarization” to distinguish it from polarization of underlying ideologies, or lack thereof (Iyengar et al., ; Lelkes, ). This term is fitting for the growth in hard feelings that regularly occurs in a wide range of repeated bilateral interactions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just a Big Misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian Affective Polarization

Stone

2020

Int Economic Review

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I present a model of affective polarization—growth in hostility over time between two parties—via quasi‐Bayesian inference. In the model, two agents repeatedly choose actions. Each choice is based on a balance of concerns for private interests and the social good. More weight is put on private interests when an agent's character is intrinsically more self‐serving and when the other agent is believed to be more self‐serving. Each agent Bayesian updates about the other's character, and dislikes the other more when she is perceived as more self‐serving. I characterize the effects on growth in dislike of three biases: a prior bias against the other agent's character, the false consensus bias, and limited strategic thinking. Prior bias against the other's character remains constant or declines over time, and actions do not diverge. The other two biases cause actions to become more extreme over time and repeatedly be “worse” than expected, causing mutual growth in dislike, that is, affective polarization. The magnitude of dislike can become arbitrarily large—even when both players are arbitrarily “good” (unselfish). The results imply that seemingly irrelevant cognitive biases can be an important cause of the devolution of relationships, in politics and beyond, and that subtlety and unawareness of bias can be key factors driving the degree of polarization.

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Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements

Cited by 332 publications

References 42 publications

The Contingent, Contextual Nature of the Relationship Between Needs for Security and Certainty and Political Preferences: Evidence and Implications

The Contingent, Contextual Nature of the Relationship Between Needs for Security and Certainty and Political Preferences: Evidence and Implications

Media, fake news, and debunking

Just a Big Misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian Affective Polarization

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