2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.121766
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Matching donations based on social capital in Internet crowdfunding can promote cooperation

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Cited by 21 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…We note that this solution can also be observed for low-tax cases. This finding underlines that such a solution can emerge not only in traditional rock-scissors-papers type game, but can be observed in a wider scale of systems which can be characterized by the concept of evolutionary game theory [61,62,63,64,65,66,67]. Thirdly, we point out the rotating spirals pattern resulting from cyclically dominant strategies can easily cause serious finite-size problems.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 53%
“…We note that this solution can also be observed for low-tax cases. This finding underlines that such a solution can emerge not only in traditional rock-scissors-papers type game, but can be observed in a wider scale of systems which can be characterized by the concept of evolutionary game theory [61,62,63,64,65,66,67]. Thirdly, we point out the rotating spirals pattern resulting from cyclically dominant strategies can easily cause serious finite-size problems.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 53%
“…We would like to stress that non-transitive relations among competing strategies are more widespread than one may naïvely expected and they are not restricted to the Lotka-Volterra-, or RSPtype systems [41,42,43,44,45,46,47], but can be potentially found in broader range of evolutionary game models [48,49,50,51,52,53,54]. In general, when we increase the number of available strategies the mentioned relation among competitors emerges almost inevitably [55,56,57].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…It is always an individual decision whether we want to cooperate and contribute to a common venture or not. In short term it could pay to save such cost and only enjoy the fruit of efforts, but in long term, if everybody else think similarly then we cannot avoid the so-called tragedy of the commons trajectory [58,59,60,61,62,63,64]. In other words, we will face to the consequence of our choice.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%