2015
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2015.0922
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Matching in the Sourcing Market: A Structural Analysis of the Upstream Channel

Abstract: B uilding on the structural two-sided matching model, we develop a framework to study the sourcing market in the context of marketing firms matching with manufacturers. Both sides prefer partners that could generate significant values with better sourcing process abilities. Moreover, experienced manufacturers are preferred by the branded marketing firms who may even be willing to compensate the matching intermediary more for facilitating that preference. Empirical research, measuring the values of such matchin… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…When clubs perceive a danger that they will simply become a number in a portfolio, the potential value creation of entering such a relationship is devalued and thus acts as a constraint to entering into an outsourcing partnership with an agent. This is supported by empirical evidence from outside of the sporting context where the principal prefers agents that can generate significant value for the firm (Ni & Srinivasan, 2015). Similarly, then, performance uncertainty reduces the likelihood of value creation and deters clubs from outsourcing.…”
Section: Barriers To Outsourcing: a Right Holder Perspectivementioning
confidence: 86%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…When clubs perceive a danger that they will simply become a number in a portfolio, the potential value creation of entering such a relationship is devalued and thus acts as a constraint to entering into an outsourcing partnership with an agent. This is supported by empirical evidence from outside of the sporting context where the principal prefers agents that can generate significant value for the firm (Ni & Srinivasan, 2015). Similarly, then, performance uncertainty reduces the likelihood of value creation and deters clubs from outsourcing.…”
Section: Barriers To Outsourcing: a Right Holder Perspectivementioning
confidence: 86%
“…For example, 'professionalism of senior management', 'compliments existing relationships', and 'appropriate contract length', reflect a wider value proposition beyond monetary reward. This is supported in the context of marketing firms matching with manufacturers, where partnerships that can generate significant value are central to the outsourcing relationship (Ni & Srinivasan, 2015). Though, 'previous outsourcing literature does not consistently support better outsourcing outcomes based on longer contract duration' (Lee et al, 2016, p. 73), agency theory contends that in long-term relationships principals learn more about agents thus minimising agency problems (Zu & Kaynak, 2012), and this certainly appears to be a fundamental motivation for agents observed here.…”
Section: Motivations Of Sport Marketing Agentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The matching model we use in this paper follows previous empirical work on matching models with nontransferable utility (Chen, 2013; Honoré & Ganco, 2020; Ni & Srinivasan, 2015; Park, 2013; Sørensen, 2007). Partners belong to two distinct sides and want to maximize the value of each match independently of other matching decisions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this paper, we investigate the relationship between network centrality and alliance performance in the context of alliances between partners fulfilling different roles. Firms can execute alliances by fulfilling different roles in a variety of ways ‐ for instance, biotech and pharmaceutical firms (Mindruta, Moeen, & Agarwal, 2016), designers and manufacturers (Ni & Srinivasan, 2015), or suppliers and purchasers (McEvily, Zaheer, & Fudge Kamal, 2017). We use a rigorous method to empirically estimate the contributions from suppliers and buyers on alliance performance while accounting for the mutual selection of partners in the alliance.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Extant research has examined dependence asymmetry less frequently than joint dependence (Hingley 2005;Kumar 1996). Ni and Srinivasan (2015) pointed out that firms and manufacturers prefer partners with similar sizes, implying their motivation to seek for partnerships with symmetric dependences. However, in reality, few relationships are ideally balanced with equal dependence between the parties.…”
Section: Dependence Asymmetry As the Internal Politymentioning
confidence: 99%