Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap

Levine, Joseph

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x

Cited by 1,381 publications

(554 citation statements)

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“…Cortical networks in turn can exert control over BAS (6) and CBS (1) closing a normative valuation feedback loop. In addition, frontal cortex can inhibit input to sensory thalamic nuclei through projections to the reticular nucleus of the thalamus imposing validation gate driven 'blindness' for task irrelevant states (7). See text for further explanation.…”

Section: (C) Empirical and Methodological Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The, so-called, hard problem is an offspring of this dualist tradition. Indeed, today, it is common in the study of consciousness to pay tribute to the division between the Hard Problem and the Easy Problems (HPEP) [6] or the, socalled, explanatory gap [7]: how can we explain the 'raw feel' of the experience of being like something such as Thomas Nagel or his notorious bat [8]? However, behind this profoundness hides a simple syllogism: Science advances third person descriptions of natural phenomena; Conscious experience is first person, therefore, Consciousness cannot be described by science.…”

Section: Introduction 'That Is Very Hokey!'mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Verschure

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'. Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene.This article is part of the themed issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'.

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Section: (C) Empirical and Methodological Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction 'That Is Very Hokey!'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Verschure

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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show abstract

“…Es sprechen jedenfalls viele gute Gründe dafür, dass nicht nur Menschen über bewusste Zustände verfügen; s. Perler/Wild (2005). 7 Zum Problem der "Erklärungslücke" siehe Levine (1983; Bewusstseinsprozesse genau zu verstehen und zu erklären, gar nicht vor schwer wiegende oder gar unlösbare Probleme gestellt sind; im Gegenteil. Nach Dennett ist eine Erklärung von bewussten mentalen Prozessen ohne Weiteres möglich.…”

Section: Phänomenales Erleben Als Besonderesunclassified

Bewusstsein als funktionales Element der natürlichen Welt

Ganten¹,

Gerhardt²,

Nida‐Rümelin³

2008

Funktionen Des Bewusstseins

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“…The model is clearly the reflection of an intellectual crisis in psychiatry, that can be attributed to a decline of clinical observation as the source of fundamental scientific challenges (3). As Feinstein remarked, in clinical medicine, "all the fundamental scholarly ideas come from elsewhere, and clinicians apparently have nothing important to contribute beyond their work in applying the basic ideas" (4).…”

Section: Rdoc Is Necessary But Very Oversold Allen Francesmentioning

confidence: 99%

RDoC is necessary, but very oversold

Frances

2014

World Psychiatry

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Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap

Cited by 1,381 publications

References 0 publications

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Bewusstsein als funktionales Element der natürlichen Welt

RDoC is necessary, but very oversold

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